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Abstract 
This dissertation briefly explains the effects of continuing the 
hazardous waste trade, followed by a discussion of Thor Chemicals 
as a local example of this trade and its effects, before going on 
to discuss the international attempts at trying to curb this 
trade. The focus of attention will then turn to the merits and 
demerits of imposing an international ban. Finally, the document 
will conclude with a critical analysis of the law and policy 
governing hazardous waste in South Africa and possible 




One of the most selfish aspects of humankind that distinguishes 
it from the remainder of life on earth is the characteristic of 
producing waste that not only endangers its own prospects of 
survival, but also those of the myriad plant and animal species 
that inhabit the planet with it. In the natural world, resources 
used and discarded by some living creatures become nutrients or 
raw materials for others. This re-use of raw materials 
contributes towards the circle of life as Mother Nature intended. 
Consequently, no true wastes exist in the natural world. Humans, 
on the other hand, are responsible for the depletion of the 
earth's natural resources. This one- directional use threatens a 
system that cannot support life indefinitely, even though methods 
of recycling and re-use do exist. However, due to a combination 
of overconsumption, ignorance, apathy, and an out-of-sight-out­
of-mind attitude, the threat to the environment posed by human 
wastes persists, ensuring that avenues like cleaner production 
methods, recycling and re-use remain, for the large part, 
untouched. 
Hazardous waste has been the focus of much debate in the recent 
past, and, due to the nature of the topic, this debate has 
concerned itself with several controversial issues. These have 
ranged from trying to regulate the international trade in such 
waste, to highlighting its effects, and, to formulating a 
definition, descriptive and definitive enough to clarify its 
composition, while at the same time, preventing any attempts by 
opportunists from relying on convenient loopholes, both legal and 
otherwise, to avert all forms of regulation. 
2 
The legal definition of hazardous waste will be considered at a 
later stage, nevertheless, for the purposes of an introduction, 
it is submitted that the following definition is suitable: 
Hazardous waste may be defined as 
solid or liquid waste, or combination thereof, that, because 
of its quantity, concentration, or physical/chemical or 
infectious characteristics, may -
{i) cause or significantly contribute to an increase in 
mortality or an increase in serious irreversible or 
incapacitating reversible illness, or 
(ii) pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human
heal th or the environment when improperly treated,
stored, transported, 
managed. 1 
disposed of, or otherwise
In 1947 global hazardous waste production is estimated to have 
been only five million metric tons. 2 Today, however, the 
industrialised nations, producing ninety percent of the world's 
hazardous waste3, generate between three hundred and four hundred 
million tons annually.4 From the sheer volumes it is not 
E.W.Miller & R.M.Miller Contemporary World Issues, 
Environmental Hazards: Toxic Waste and Hazardous Materials (1991} 
4. 
2 
J. H. Marbury 'Hazardous Waste Exportation: The Global 
Manifestation of Environmental Racism' (1995) 28 Vanderbilt 
Journal of Transnational Law 255 (hereafter referred to as 
Marbury) 
3 
R.H. Shearer 'Comparative Analysis of the Basel and Bamako 
Conventions on Hazardous Waste' (1993) 23 Environmental Law 144 




difficult to realize that these are the most unwanted of human 
by-products, and in the recent past, there has been an increase 
in awareness by the waste-producing developed world that it is 
becoming exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to dispose of 
such wastes in an environmentally safe and secure manner. This, 
coupled with the tightening up of environmental laws and the 
increase in cost of disposal of such wastes has led producers to 
look elsewhere to dispose of their waste. The scapegoats are the 
developing countries of the so-called Third World, which are less 
equipped than their industrialised neighbours to deal with such 
waste. Environmental awareness in these countries, is generally 
lacking, as are the laws regulating waste disposal. Consequently, 
it is more profitable for producers and generators of hazardous 
waste to export their wastes for disposal to these countries, 
than it is for them to do so in their own backyard. 
Hazardous waste disposal has become its own industry with 
unscrupulous companies buying waste from industries or government 
agencies and then arranging for it to be shipped to the Third 
World: a practice that has been described by many African 
countries as an extension of colonialism, slavery and 
environmental racism. Studies conducted by Weir and Porterfield5 
revealed the existence of companies in the United States buying 
toxic waste for sale to the Third World. The largest known 
operation was that conducted by the Colbert brothers in New York 
and along the Eastern Seaboard of the USA. 6 From their studies it 
was revealed that not only companies, but also government 
departments, including the Department of Agriculture and the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had sold their wastes to 
the Colberts. 
5 
D. Weir & A Porterfield 'US Exports Hazardous Wastes to
Third World' in Third World Network (Ed) 'Toxic Terror: Dumping 
of Hazardous Wastes in the Third .World' at 26 ff. 
6 
They relabelled a shipment of waste as pure dry-cleaning 
solvent and sold it to a company in Zimbabwe, which bought it 
with funds from the US Agency for International Development. 
4 
Hundreds of shipments of hazardous waste have been sent from the 
developed countries to contaminate the developing world. A study 
by Greenpeace revealed that one hundred and fifteen such 
shipments, between 1989 and 1991, had been sent to Latin American 
and African countries. 7 An example of such a shipment is that of 
a West German company planning to export various hazardous wastes 
to Liberia. The company cited adequate dumping capacity, 
political stability and good geographical location as to why 
Liberia was a good dump site. It also stated ' We can solve the 
waste problem in West Germany by building a depot in Liberia.' 8
The most notorious of all shipments is probably that of the Khian 
Sea, a ship carrying fourteen thousand tons of toxic incinerator 
ash from Philadelphia. It sailed the seas for over two years 
looking for a country that would allow it to dump its waste. The 
ship approached nineteen countries on five continents including 
the Bahamas, Bermuda, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, Guinea­
Bissau, the Philippines and other South-Bast Asian countries, 
before allegedly dumping its contents in an unknown location, 
presumably the Indian Ocean. 9 
7 
Third World Network 'Toxic Waste Dumping in Third World 
Countries' in Toxic Terror 8. These countries included Mexico, 
Argentina, Brazil,· Panama, Uruguay, Morocco, Senegal, Gabon, 
Guinea-Bissau, Djibouti, Zimbabwe and South Africa. 
8 Third World Network in 'Toxic Terror' 9. 
9 D.J.Abrams 'Regulating the International Hazardous Waste
Trade: A Proposed Global Solution' (1990} 28 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 808-809 (hereafter referred to as Abrams); 
M.Critharis, 'Third World Nations are Down in the Dumps: The
Exportation of Hazardous Wastes' (1990) 16 Brooklyn Journal of
International Law 318 {hereafter referred to as Critharis).
5 
In the past hazardous waste exports have not only been conducted 
with governments directlyL0 but also with individuals. 11 Since
1989 industrialised countries have legally exported five million 
tons of hazardous waste, the primary motivation for this being 
economic. 12 Third World countries are willing to accept First 
World waste in return for much needed foreign exchange. And the 
First World countries are more than willing to comply. The cost 
of hazardous waste disposal has skyrocketed in these countries 
since the tightening of environmental regulations in the 1980s, 
where it may cost between $1000 and $2500 per ton, whereas 
African countries have accepted the said waste for a
comparatively insignificant $40 per ton. 13 Related to this is the 
fact that developing countries are finding it increasingly 
difficult to repay the interest on foreign loans, let alone the 
loans themselves, received from the countries producing the 
waste. Hence, the foreign currency received by a country for 
accepting the waste is simply a way of relieving their debt 
10 See n 10-13 and accompanying text. 
LI One such contract was in 1987 between Sunday Nana, a 
Nigerian farmer, and Italian national Gianfranco Raffaeli. It was 
though his company, Iruekpen Construction Company, that the waste 
was imported. The waste was to be stored on Nana's land near the 
port of Koko, and he was assured that it was not dangerous. Nana 
was to receive approximately$ 120 a month for the storage. It 
was only when Nigerian students in Italy wrote to their 
government, informing them of the presence of the wastes, that 
they found out about it. On inspection of these supposedly 
harmless wastes, it was found that they contained 
polychorobyphenyls (PCBs}, one of the most dangerous chemicals 
in the world. Those involved in the transaction were arrested, 
the government recalled its ambassador from Rome and called on 
the Italian government to remove the waste from Koko. Shortly 
after this event the Nigerian government enacted the Toxic Waste 
(Special Criminal Law) 42\1988. In terms of this law it is an 
offence to receive, store, or dispose on the Nigerian territory 
or in territorial waters any toxic waste, an offence punishable 
by death. It is also an offence to attempt the same. See further 
C.M.Peter 'The Right to a Clean Environment: A Note on the Export
of Toxic Wastes to Africa' (1990) 6 Lesotho Law Journal 36-37 &
50 (hereafter referred to as Peter).
12 Marbury 2 5 6 . 
13 Peter 32. 
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burden. 14 
One such agreement was that between Guinea-Bissau and a group of 
European tanneries and pharmaceutical companies. 15 It was a five­
year $600 million contract for which Guinea-Bissau was to be paid 
$120 million a year for the disposal of three million tons of 
toxic waste . 16 This yearly receipt of 'waste earnings' was 
equivalent to the West African country's Gross National Product 
(GNP} . 17 Fortunately however the contract was reversed and the 
Guinea-Bissau government banned the import of hazardous waste, 
the Minister of Health arguing that the contract represented a 
threat to the country's security, resources and its people. 
Furthermore, there would be risk of radioactive pollution which 
could contaminate surface and subterranean water. The Minister 
also noted that even the smallest rumour of pollution would be 
sufficient to harm the country's tourist industry . 18 
Following from these statistics it can be seen that, when the 
domestic costs of disposal greatly exceed the costs of similar 
disposal abroad, hazardous waste producers will opt to export 
their wastes instead of dispose of them at home. This is one of 
the many reasons why there had to be international regulation of 
hazardous wastes. Not only is this the case from a humanitarian 
perspective, but more importantly, from a legal one as well, in 
that such regulation would provide a recognised basis on which to 
combat the exploitation of developing nations in this regard. 
Consequently, it is necessary, from a legal viewpoint to consider 
the implications of regulating the trade in hazardous waste on an 
international scale, as well as the relevant instruments 
responsible for ensuring such effective regulation. 
14 P.Lukey, C.Albertyn & H.Coetzee: 'Wasting Away: South
Africa and the Global Waste Problem' in Cock J. & Koch E. (Eds) 
Going Green: People, Politics and the Environment (1991) 168 
(hereafter referred to as Lukey et al). 
15 Marbury 2 5 7. 
16 Peter 32. 
IT Lukey et al 12. 
18 Peter 33 n 35. 
7 
The consequences of hazardous waste generation and disposal are 
numerous, and its ef fee ts are far-reaching. It is to these 
effects that the focus of this discussion will now turn. This 
will then be followed by a brief outline of the incidents 
surrounding Thor Chemicals' mercury processing activities, at 
Cato Ridge in KwaZulu-Natal. The remainder of the document will 
then concern itself with the international agreements governing 
the trade in hazardous waste, the controversy surrounding 
proposals to ban the export of such wastes to developing 
countries and the former Eastern Bloc countries, as well as South 
Africa's law and policy towards hazardous waste regulation. This 
will include criticisms of both the plethora of legislation 
governing the topic in South Africa and the recent Policy on 
Hazardous Waste Management published by the Department of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism 19, followed by possible 
su ggestions for the future regulation of hazardous waste in South 
Africa. 
19 GN Rl5987 of 30 September 1994. 
8 
II: EFFECTS OF HAZARDOUS WASTE. 
Unfortunately the effects of hazardous waste have been 
considered externalities of the hazardous waste trade. The only 
gains to be made from this lucrative trade are the short-term 
economic profits experienced by the willing participants, 
usually at the long-term expense of the health and well-being of 
both the human population and the environment of the Third World 
countries targeted by the trading onslaught. 
If the wastes are dumped indiscriminately they will have an 
immediate impact on the surrounding environment, contaminating 
the soil, killing the vegetation, polluting the groundwater, 
spilling over into riverine and marine systems contaminating 
their resources. And, even if the waste is stored in containers 
and concealed in dumps they will inevitably escape in the future 
as the containers and sites corrode with time. 1 The effect of an 
escape of this sort results in a ripple effect: rivers polluted 
by the effluent will kill off the river resources jeopardising 
the lives of the people who depend on it for their livelihood. 2
The soil also becomes contaminated rendering it useless for 
agricultural purposes depleting precious resources and 
endangering human life. 
1 Third World Network in 'Toxic Terror' 16. 
2 This was the situation when mercury was released by Thor 
Chemicals into the Mngcweni River, which eventually feeds the 
Inanda Dam, the source of Durban's water needs. See further 
discussion on Thor Chemicals (Ch III). 
9 
Environmental Costs: 
The impact of hazardous wastes on the environment only becomes 
known once it is too late, surroundings become contaminated and 
are rendered unfit for use, be it human or natural. In the 
Balkans four thousand tons of toxic waste were dumped at Sulina, 
where the Danube flows into the Black Sea. In July of 198 8, 
seven Romanian politicians were jailed for between eleven and 
eighteen years for their part in the dumping operations. It was 
alleged that this catastrophe was the result of a deal between 
the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Trade, West Germany, Holland 
and Italy to allow dumping at Sulina by a Liechtenstein-based 
firm called Kimika. After the waste was dumped, the barrels in 
which it was contained began to leak. This resulted in 
considerable environmental damage in the Danube Delta which had 
some of the rarest species of wild birds in and around the Black 
Sea. Sulina was declared a disaster area. 3
Human health 
Thousands of chemicals and radioactive substances produced by 
industry are detrimental to health and can prove fatal. A large 
percentage of the waste that industry disposes of is toxic, with 
direct skin contact, ingestion or inhalation posing serious 
health risks, yet, of the hundreds of toxic chemicals disposed 
of each year, very few have been fully tested for their impact 
on health and the environment. This may be true, nonetheless, 
there have been many documented incidents around the world of 
the consequences inherent in the improper disposal of hazardous 
wastes. Probably one of the most infamous is that of Love Canal 
in the United States. In 1842 William Love proposed to build a 
power canal along the Niagara River, however, it was only 
partial 1 y comp 1 e ted when the proj ec t was abandoned. In 19 4 O 
Hooker Chemicals bought the land and until 1953 used it as a 
3 Third World Network in 'Toxic Terror' 9.
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waste disposal site. An estimated twenty thousand tons of waste 
was buried in the canal. In 1953 the land was sold. A school was 
built on the rim of the canal and the remainder was sold for 
residential purposes. 4 In 1976 foul-smelling liquids and sludge 
seeped into the basements of houses built on top of the dump. 
President Carter declared Love Canal a disaster area, the school 
was closed and the residents evacuated. In 1980 various tests 
were conducted showing that some residents had damaged 
chromosomes {raising the possibility of cancer in the living and 
unpredictable outcomes on future generations5 ), seizures, 
miscarriages (women located in certain areas of the canal 
suffered miscarriages fifty percent higher than the normal 
rate6) and birth defects. Millions of dollars have been spent on 
the clean-up of the town and purchase of the homes. Lawsuits 
totalling billions of dollars have been brought by residents 
against Hooker Chemicals, the Niagara Falls Board of Education 
and the City of Niagara Falls and both the New York State and 
the EPA have sued Hooker but it is unlikely that these claims 
will be settled in the years to come. Love Canal, meanwhile, is 
a ghost town. 7 
Transportation hazards: 
With the international trade in hazardous wastes come the risks 
inherent in such a trade. The fact is that ships can and do 
sink, but more importantly, transporters have diminished 
incentive to avoid accidents resulting from such shipments 
partly because most countries' liability regulations are either 
non-existent, weak or unenfbrceable once the waste has left its 
4 E.W.Miller & R.M.Miller 'Contemporary World Issues: 
Environmental Hazards: Toxic Waste and Hazardous Materials' 19-21 
(hereafter referred to as Miller & Miller). 
5 Third World Network in 'Toxic Terror' 15-16. 
6 Miller & Miller 20. 
7 Ibid. 
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country of origin. 8 For example, liability under the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability 
Act9 for US generators does not apply extraterritorially10, 
hence without the likelihood of liability, generators and 
transporters may tend to be more careless with their cargo 
thereby increasing the probability of an accident. Secondly, 
hazardous wastes generally have a negative value and therefore 
lack the usual incentives present for protecting cargo. A prime 
example of this would be the Khian Sea, whose cargo mysteriously 
vanished following the ship's refusal of entry by more than 
nineteen countries. 
Economic costs: 
Because of the health risks associated with hazardous wastes 
they need to be treated or stored properly, this itself incurs 
additional economic costs. Of further concern is the clean-up of 
toxic wastes that already exist and which, in the past have been 
dumped carelessly and indiscriminately on land, in water or 
unsatisfactory dumpsites. In the United States, the world's 
largest producer of hazardous wastes, the EPA identified over 
seventy-four thousand dumpsites of which thirty-two thousand 
were rated as bad as or worse than Love Canal. 11 Of more 
importance however, is the fact that only seven or eight of 
these sites are being cleaned up per year under the Superfund. 
In the build-up to the passing of CERCLA in 1980, the 
President's Council on Environmental Quality estimated that the 
cost of clean-up/remedial actions would be approximately $22 
8 Marbury 259. 
9 
1994). 
1980 42 use sections 9601-9675 (1988 & Supplement VI 
10 Marbury 259. 
11 Third World Network in 'Toxic Terror' 16. 
12 
billion12 , and to get an idea of the costs involved in such a 
clean-up, the bill for Love Canal alone was $130 million. 13 
Therefore, even from an economic point of view it is not 
worthwhile for developing countries to accept hazardous waste. 
The short term monetary gain would be meagre indeed compared to 
the damage suffered to health and the environment, and the 
eventual costs needed to clean up the wastes once their harm had 
been done . 14 
The past discussion has been a general overview of the nature of 
hazardous waste and the problems inherent in seeking to continue 
such a trade. It is submitted that before one goes on to discuss 
the core of the topic, a brief study of the events of Thor 
Chemicals at Cato Ridge, in Kwazulu-Natal, would be necessary to 
bring the focus of attention closer to home. This will further 
highlight the need to ban the trade in all forms of hazardous 
waste, both internationally and to South Africa, in an attempt 
to prevent a similar incident from happening in the future. 
12 C.Hodgden 'Environmental Law: The Evolving Liability
Framework of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)' (1994) 47 Oklahoma Law
Review 139. 
13 Third World Network in 'Toxic Terror' 16. 
14 Third World Network op cit 1 7 . 
13 
III: THOR CHEMICALS. 
I don 1 t deny that workers get sick, but mad, that's 
nonsense. We check the guys' urine every week and if levels 
exceed 200 micrograms of mercury p er litre they are given 
orange juice to drink and taken away from the plant.' 1 
Greenpeace claimed the Thor Chemicals incident to be the worst 
case in the international waste trade yet discovered. 2 At least 
two people died and twenty-nine other serious cases of mercury 
poisoning were recorded, along with widespread ecological damage 
as a result of the toxic trade scheme. 3 The deal involved the 
pretext and presumption of environmentally sound waste 
management, via the recycling loophole4 , to import hazardous 
waste from the United States and Europe into South Africa. 5 
Furthermore, the South African government exempted Thor from its 
1 Steve van der Vyver, Managing Director, Thor Chemicals, 
South Africa. Earthlife/Greenpeace 'Wasted Lives: Ban the Waste
Trade' No. 4, Recycling Series (1994) 20 (hereafter referred to 
as Earthlife). 
2 Earthlife 1. 
3 Ibid. 
4 This loophole is present in both European Community 
(Regulation 259/93) and American legislation (Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act 1976). Moreover, even if South 
Africa and the United States had been parties to the Basel 
Convention at the time of contracting it would have allowed the 
export since it makes allowances for recycling. See further 
discussion on International Agreements on Hazardous Wastes (Ch 
IV) 
5 The companies involved were: Thor 1 s UK plant in Margate, 
American Cyanamid in New Jersey, USA, Borden Chemicals and 
Plastics, Louisiana, USA, Calgon Carbon Corporation, USA through 
a subsidiary in Indonesia. Earthlife l. 
14 
so-called waste import ban6 , calling its imports secondary raw 
materials. The then Minister of Environment Affairs, Gert Kotze, 
defended Thor's right to import saying that it was a bona fide 
manufacturing industry. 7 
Thor was paid approximately $1,100 per ton to accept the 
hazardous waste, but it was revealed that they were not actually 
reprocessing the mercury. Instead, the company was making 
profits from claiming that they were and then simply storing the 
waste while attempting to operate unsound incinerator technology 
which, by their own admission, had failed to work effectively. 8 
Thor's operational atrocities were initially revealed when high 
levels of mercury were recorded in the Umgeni River 
approximately twenty-five kilometres from the plant. 9 The levels 
in the river were found to be one thousand times the World 
Health Organisation's (WHO) safe level for drinking water. 10 In 
addition, the Mngcweni, a smaller river upstream, was 
contaminated with mercury to such an extent that the local 
villagers had to be provided with drinking water from the 
surrounding areas. On the 21 February an ANC11 -sponsored 
delegation toured Thor. They were allowed free access to all 
areas of the plant and discovered three warehouses containing in 
6 Lukey et al, at 170, state that the import of hazardous 
waste was apparently banned by a Ministerial Proclamation in 
September 1990, yet no such Proclamation has ever been gazetted. 
7 Lukey et al 170. Although the Ministerial proclamation 
banning waste imports clearly stated that no hazardous waste 
could be imported, Koos Stander, The Department of Environment 
Affairs Director for Hazardous Waste had said that other 
companies could be granted the right to import toxic waste if 
they intended to extract raw materials from it, provided they 
complied with South Africa's water pollution and industrial 
safety regulations. 
8 Earthlife 1. 
9 Earthlife 16. 
10 Ibid. 
11 African National Congress. 
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the region of ten thousand barrels of mercury wastes. 12 Mr Van 
der Vyver, the Managing Director of Thor, admitted to the 
delegation that Thor had not been processing the stockpiled 
waste. He also stated that for the past three years the plant 
had not made any product from recovered mercury. Furthermore, he 
admitted that the stockpiled waste was not economically viable 
and that it would cost Thor a vast sum of money to incinerate 
it, let alone recycle it. The only real profit gained from the 
entire operation was the $1,100 per ton Thor was paid to receive 
the waste. 13 
One of the most disturbing features of Thor's operations were 
the conditions under which its workers were employed. The 
company employed unskilled workers to work with the high-risk 
procedures, without adequate training or supervision. The 
atmosphere of the workplace was highly contaminated with 
airborne and contact mercury, while no effective or proper use 
of protective clothing had been required .or provided14 , as Thor 
did not check whether the workers used or looked after their 
protective equipment properly. 15 In fact, most of the workers 
were not informed of the dangers posed by mercury or educated 
about the symptoms associated with mercury poisoning. Nor was 
there an induction programme to make sure that all employees 




15 Earthlife 26. 
16 Ibid. 
16 
The company's attitude towards occupational safety could best be 
epitomized by the fact that one of the factory supervisors, used 
to train the workers, was himself cont·aminated by high levels of 
mercury in 1991. 17 In essence, Thor's general disregard for the 
heal th of the workers was evident in the way the company 
monitored its workers, the way these employees were trained, the 
general conditions at the plant and the absence of any real 
health or medical services. 
In most other countries Thor's activities would have been 
outlawed, but South Africa's previous government believed Thor's 
processing activities to satisfy the important environmental 
pri�ciple of optimising the use of a resource. It also said that 
the state-of-the-art process had great merit in conservation of 
the environment, yet Mr. Van der Vyver admitted that they had 
had major problems with their processes and had been unable to 
retrieve usable mercury.� 
Notwithstanding this so-called state-of-the-art technology Thor 
was unable to prevent the most serious industrial contamination 
in South Africa's history. In allowing Thor to continue its 
practises the South African government not only turned a blind 
eye to the consequences, allowing Thor to carry on its business 
with little interference from the authorities, but also allowed 
it to exploit its workforce, exposing some to mercury levels 
well beyond the internationally accepted limits.� 
17 Ibid. 
18 Earthlife 7.
19 The World Health Organisation's safe limit for mercury in 
urine is fifty parts per billion (ppb). Earthlife 26. 
17 
The case of Thor Chemicals is a compelling enough example of the 
terrors involved in hazardous waste to warrant a full global ban 
on the export of such wastes, not only to developing countries, 
but also generally, since the likelihood of a similar event 
occurring may not be restricted to these countries alone. 
Certain industrialised countries have claimed that the recycling 
of hazardous wastes can be carried out in an environmentally 
safe manner in developing countries, thereby justifying 
economically motivated exports to such countries. Unfortunately 
for such claims Thor illustrates that even countries, such as 
South Africa, that claim to have state-of-the-art technology 
cannot fully guarantee any degree of protection for its citizens 
or its environment. 20 Moreover, this negatively implies that the
developed countries, in making this statement, do not have the 
technical capacity to recycle it themselves. This, however is 
hard to believe since if they have the technological capability 
to produce the waste then it follows that they should have the 
necessary capacity to recycle it. 
The problem with Thor specifically is that it is a subsidiary of 
a company from the United Kingdom, a so-called developed 
country. In this case then, it might have been expected that an 
environmentally safe manner of recycling would have been more 
easy to attain than had the company been an entirely South 
African venture. 21 Instead Thor has found itself being one of
the first recycling companies to have been held responsible for 
the death of inhabitants in a waste recipient country. 22 
20 Earthlife 35. 
21 According to Des Cowley, a major shareholder in Thor, the 
plant is an application of state-of-the-art technology, and is 
an enlargement of the original pilot plant in the UK. Earthlife 
14. 
22 Earthlife 35. 
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This has been a brief, but important outline of the events and 
consequences surrounding the incidents at Thor Chemicals. It has 
been necessary, it is submitted, to draw attention to this 
tragedy in order to highlight the affects of South Africa's 
previous position with respect to the international trade in 
hazardous wastes. It is to this that the focus of this paper now 
turns, and more specifically, the agreements governing such 
trade. 
19 
IV: INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON HAZARDOUS WASTE. 
Transboundary movement of hazardous waste clearly affects more 
than just the importing nation, it also affects its neighbours 
and every country along the transportation route. Since the 
1980s, the international community has come to realize the 
potential global dangers inherent in this issue, and has joined 
together in a conscious effort to combat the problem. What was 
necessary was the establishment of global, uniform principles 
from which any regional agreement, if, and once established, 
could not deviate. However, although it is quite clear that the 
risks associated with the hazardous waste trade have become 
public knowledge only recently, some pertinent customary 
international law principles should be looked at. 
Firstly, certain duties accrue to states by virtue of possessing 
territory.1 Included in this is the obligation on every state
'not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts 
contrary to the rights of other states ' 2 This principle of 
customary law was adopted from the Trail Smelter Arbitration 
{United States v Canada 1941) in which it was said: 
11Under principles of international law as well as the law 
of the United States, no state has the right to use or 
permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to 
cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or 
the properties of persons therein, when the case is of 
serious consequences and the injury established. 113 
J.I.Glazewski 'Regulating Transboundary Movement of
Hazardous Waste: International Developments and Implications for 
South Africa' (1993) 26 Comparative and International Law Journal 
of South Africa 234, 238 {hereafter referred to as Glazewski). 
2 Ibid. 
3 R . F . Fugg le & M.A. Rab ie {Eds) 'Environmental Management in 
South Africa' (1994) 161. 
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It follows therefore, that states have a responsibility to 
ensure that certain activities within their jurisdiction or 
control do not cause damage to the environments of other 
states. 4 Implicit 1.n this declaration is the acknowledgement 
that pollution knows no human boundaries and is truly a global 
phenomenon. 
Secondly, one could consider the abuse of rights doctrine and 
whether there is a general rule of customary law prohibiting the 
abuse of such rights. This doctrine could be used to explain the 
rule that no state may allow its territory to be used in a way 
which causes injury by fumes to the territory of another. 5
However, while the doctrine has had some support in 
international tribunals, it has generally been accepted that it 
has not been established, either as a principle of customary 
law, or as a general principle of law recognised by civilised 
nations. 6
Apart from the above, customary law does not provide a 
comprehensive enough regime to combat the trade in hazardous 
waste. Moreover, although it has developed the right to good 
neighbourliness between nations, it has been unable to deal with 
the more pressing issue of developing countries becoming the 





Except for the international trade in wastes, this is not a 
well-developed field of international law. The law has played a 
limited role in preventing the generation of hazardous waste. 7 
Instead it has focused on the permissibility of the 
international movement and trade in such waste. 
The international waste trade has also been addressed by various 
United Nations (UN) bodies as a human rights issue. The 
following are examples of these concerns: 
* Principle l of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration -
'Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and 
adequate conditions of life, in an environment of quality 
that permits a life of dignity and well-being and he bears 
a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the 
environment for present and future generations.' 8 
* UN General Assembly Resolution 45\95 (1990) -
'All individuals are entitled to live in an environment 
adequate for their health and well-being.' 
7 P. Sands 'Principles of International Environmental Law 1 
(1995} 492. 
8 The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 
held in Stockholm, June 1972. Furthermore, Principle 21 
codifies the dictum in United States v Canada (Trail Smelter 
Arbitration} by affirming that 'states have the responsibility 
to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control 
do not cause damage to the environment of other states or of 
areas beyond the limit of their national jurisdiction.' This 
is reinforced by Principle 22 which requires states to enact 
legislation 'to develop further the international law 
regarding liability and compensation for victims of 
environmental damage.' See Critharis 322-323. 
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* UN Commission on Human Rights has affirmed the relationship
between the preservation of the environment and human
rights. 9 
* The Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities has considered the relationship
between human rights and the movement of hazardous waste10 
by declaring in draft terms that
'the movement and dumping of toxic and dangerous products 
endanger basic human rights, such as the right to life, the 
right to live in a sound and healthy environment and 
consequently the right to health.' 11 
Protection of the environment is also provided for in the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and Environment. 
Article 24 provides for the right to a clean and satisfactory 
environment. However, in the past, discussion of the environment 
on the African continent concerned itself mainly with natural 
disasters arising from floods, droughts and agricultural pests 
such as locusts. The focus however has changed since the 
revelation of exports of waste by the developed countries to the 
'Dark Continent', the result being that concerns were shifted to 
the affect such shipments would have on the people and 
environment of Africa. 
9 Resolution 1990\41 (1990). See Sands 222-223. 
10 Resolution 1988\26 {1988). See Sands op cit n 9. 
11 Resolution 1989\12 (1989). see Sands op cit n 9. 
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Unlike other areas of environmental concern it is evident that 
there are only a few international agreements that address the 
topic of hazardous waste directly. The primary agreement is the 
Basel Convention on the Control of Tranabowidary Movements of 
Hazardous Waste and Their Disposalu , since it aims to regulate 
the movement of hazardous waste on an international scale. 
However, due to various limitations perceived by many African 
nations, a regional agreement was drafted which focused on the 
concerns of the African continent. This was known as the Bamako 
Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control 
of Transboundary Movement of Ha.zardous Waste Within Africa. 13 A
third, and just as significant agreement from a South African 
point of view is the Lome IV Convention. 14 There are also some 
important bilateral agreements between the United States and 
Mexico and Canada respectively as well as various Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Acts an European 
Community Directives. 
12 Hereafter referred to as Basel. Reprinted in 
'Transboundary Movements and Disposal of Hazardous Wastes in 
International Law: Basic Documents' B.Kwiatkowska & A.H.A.Soons 
(Eds) (1993) 17-67 (hereafter referred to as Kwiatkowska). The 
convention was opened for signature on March 22, 1989, and 
lawfully entered into force on 5 May, 1992. In terms of article 
25(1) of the convention, it would enter into force ninety days 
after the twentieth ratification of its proposals. For the 
purposes of this paper it is important to note that South Africa 
finally ratified the convention in May 1994, two years after it 
had officially entered into force. 
13 Hereafter referred to as Bamako. Reprinted in Kwiatkowska 
911-947. The convention was opened for signature on January 30,
1991 but has not entered into force yet since the requisite ten
countries' signatures for it to do so have yet to be obtained.
14 Important from the perspective that until Bamako comes 
into effect South Africa would be able to support a partial ban 
(depending on which country the waste originated from) on the 
import\export of hazardous waste by subscribing to the provisions 
of the Lome Convention, which banned with immediate effect, the 
export of all hazardous wastes from European Community member 
states to African, Pacific and Caribbean {ACP) states. See 
further discussion on the Convention infra. 
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The adoption of these various conventions is an acknowledgement 
of the previous inadequacies of international law and the need 
for a more stringent form of regulation in this regard. Both 
Basel and Bamako developed from similar ideas, centring on 
United Nations (UN) efforts to control the transboundary 
movements of hazardous waste. Yet, as the beginnings of a final 
convention began to emerge it soon became apparent to some 
developing counties that the United Nations Environment 
Programme's (UNEP) proposals were not going to meet their needs. 
Consequently, when the final draft of Basel was promulgated in 
1989, African states, under the auspices of the Organisation of 
African Unity (OAU), rejected its formulation, and, as an 
alternative, went about preparing Bamako. 
Background to Basel 
UNEP had been involved with the environmentally sound management 
and disposal of hazardous waste, including the controversy 
surrounding its transboundary movement since the early l980s. 
Following the recommendations of the 1981 Montevideo Meeting of 
Senior Government Officials Expert in Environmental Law, adopted 
by the UNEP Governing council in 1982, UNEP initiated work with 
government experts on the development of the Guidelines for the 
Environmentally Sound Management of Hazardous Wastes15 (Cairo 
Guidelines). These were completed in Cairo in 1985 and adopted 
by the UNEP Governing Council in 1987. At the same time, the 
Council authorized its Executive Director to organise a series 
of regional workshops to discuss further cooperation between the 
developed and developing countries in implementing the 
Guidelines . 16 
15 Basel Convention Secretariat: The Basel Convention and 
African Countries. Basel Convention Series/SBC No. : 94/010 




The Cairo Guidelines were aimed at national governments, to help 
them in developing effective policies to handle issues of 
hazardous waste management. Specifically, they called for 
international cooperation between countries given their joint 
responsibility towards protecting the environment . 17 The 
Guidelines proposed a prior informed consent mechanism as a 
precondition for hazardous waste shipments18 and in doing so 
they acknowledged that, in promoting safe hazardous waste 
management, there had to be regulation of the transboundary 
shipment of such wastes, whether intended for recycling, 
treatment, or final disposal in the country of import. 
This process was further enhanced by the Governing Council 
asking the Executive Director to convene a diplomatic conference 
to adopt and sign a global convention by early 1989 . 19 The 
urgency of the need to elaborate the convention was based 
primarily on the following considerations: 
* factual considerations - The 1980s were highlighted by the
tendency of developed countries to export their hazardous waste 
to the developing countries and former Eastern Bloc countries. 
This was due to three main factors 
( i) 
(ii) 
disposal in developed countries was costly and/or 
restricted by their national legislation. 
the high degree of public awareness in the 
developed countries regarding the risks inherent 
in hazardous wastes led to the development of 
strict laws regulating the management and 
disposal of such wastes. 
17 Abrams 816. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Decision 14/30 17 June 1987. 
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(iii) disposal costs were only a fraction of what they
were in the developed countries. This was the
main incentive for the export of wastes.w
• legal considerations - Most of the developing countries did
not have the requisite legal and administrative framework to
effectively control, and more importantly, prevent the dumping
of hazardous wastes in their country.
� teclmical considerations - These deve loping countries also 
lacked the necessary technical capacity and capabilities to 
dispose of the wastes in an environmentally sound manner. 
Consequently the wastes were often disposed of illegally and in 
a way which was damaging to human health and the environment. 21 
The Convention was adopted unanimously on 22 March 1989 by the 
one hundred and sixteen countries attending the Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries. The Final Act was signed by one hundred and 
five countries and the European Economic Community, and it 
entered into force on 5 May 1992.n 
w Basel Secretariat 1-2. 
21 See Ch I I n 1- 7 and accompanying text. 
n Basel Secretariat 3. 
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Background to Bamako 
The OAU officially condemned the export of hazardous waste to 
the African continent in May, 1988. The anti-dumping declaration 
was part of a joint African statement to mark the twenty-fifth 
anniversary of the Organisation.n 
contained in Resolution 115324 and 
This formal response was 
declared the dumping of 
nuclear and industrial waste in Africa to be a 'crime against 
Africa and the African People.' 25 Resolution 1153 contained the 
basic themes governing hazardous waste control that were 
subsequently incorporated into Bamako, namely -
* a ban on the import of hazardous waste into Africa,
* liability of waste generators for damage caused by their
waste,
assistance from the developed countries in monitoring and 
controlling hazardous waste movements, and 
* using ecologic.ally rational methods for the disposal of
hazardous wastes.u
23 Peter 42. 
24 Resolution CM/RES.1153(XLVIII) on Dumping of Nuclear and 
Industrial Waste in Africa 23 May 1988. Reprinted in Kwiatkowska 
957. 
� Declaration 1, Resolution 1153, op cit n 24. 
� W.J.Donald 'The Bamako Convention as a Solution to the 
Problem of Hazardous Waste Exports to Less Developed Countries' 
(1992) 17 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 419, 431 
(hereafter referred to as Donald). See further Resolution 1153 
Declarations 2, 3, 5 & 8 in Kwiatkowska 957. 
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Finally, the resolution called on the Secretary-General of the 
OAU to 'take appropriate steps to ensure the inscription of The 
Dumping of Nuclear and Industrial Wastes in Africa as an item on 
the Agenda of the Forty-third Session of the United Nations 
General Assembly.' 27 This was done in the hope that the export 
to, and dumping of, hazardous wastes in general, and 
particularly 
condemnation. 28
in Africa, would receive international 
This condemnation however, seemed to fall on deaf ears and so in 
February l989 the OAU formally recognised, in Resolution ll9929 ,
that Basel was not going to provide the protection that the OAU 
desired 
This 
'Concerned that the draft Global Convention for the Control 
of Transboundary Movement of 
aimed at the regulation or 
Hazardous Waste is merely 
control, rather than the 
prohibition, of transboundary movement of hazardous wastes, 
contrary to the spirit of Council Resolution CM/RES.1153 
(XLVIII) which determines that dumping of hazardous wastes
is a crime against Africa and the African People. ' 30 
clearly reiterated the OAU' s desire to ban the 
transboundary movement of hazardous waste, rather than simply 
regulate or control it. It further expressed concern over the 
inadequacy of the provision for the monitoring mechanism 
'Dumpwatch' and noted the inadequate provision for technical and 
financial support for the safe and environmentally-sound 
disposal of such wastes in the importing states. The Resolution 
27 Declaration 6, Resolution 1153 in Kwiatkowska 957. 
28 Peter 42-43. 
29 Resolution CM/RES 1199 (XLIX) on Global Convention for the 
Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste, 25 February 
1989. Reprinted in Kwiatkowska 958-960. 
� Kwiatkowska 959. 
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concluded by calling upon all African states to reach common 
agreement, from an African viewpoint, on ameliorating the 
inadequacies contained in the draft (Basel) convent ion. 31 As a 
result of Resolution 1199, no GAU-member nation signed Basel in 
1989. 32
The OAU followed this up with Resolution 1225. 33 It took 
cognisance of the consequences that the dumping of hazardous 
waste can have on social and economic development in Africa and 
called upon the Secretary-General to continue the preparation 
and holding of the OAU Pan-African Coordinating Committee 
Conference in Bamako, Mali. 
The main aim of this conference was to draw up a draft 
(reciprocal) agreement of African states aimed at the 
'implementation and effective prohibition of the import of 
hazardous waste into Africa. ' 34 The OAU also recognised that a 
ban on the importation of wastes would not necessarily solve the 
problem of wastes generated within Africa and called for the 
laying of foundations for regulating the movement and processing 
of such wastes. The OAU set up a working group of legal and 
environmental experts to draft the document. This was completed 
in January 1991 and presented to the delegates of the Pan­
African Conference on Environment and Sustainable Development. 
Bamako was signed by all the Environment Ministers of the OAU 
member states, and although a vast majority of African 
31 Ibid. 
32 Donald 43 o. See also Resolution 1225 (L), Kwiatkowska 960. 
The situation has, however, changed and, as of October 1994, nine 
African countries had ratified the Convention, those being Egypt, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Nigeria, Senegal, Seychelles, Tanzania, Zaire 
and South Africa. Several other (African) nations had also 
informed the Secretariat that they were in the process of 
ratifying or acceding to Basel. See Basel Secretariat 3. 
33 Resolution CM/RES 1225 (L) on Control of Transboundary 
Movement of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal in Africa, 22 
July 1989. Reprinted in Kwiatkowska 960-962. 
34 Kwiatkowska 960. 
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governments have signed the Convention35, it has yet to enter 
into force, since the tenth signature required for it to do 
still has to be obtained. 
To date only nine countries have ratified Bamako, and if South 
Africa were to become the tenth country to do so it would enter 
into force. This has far-reaching implications, not only for 
South Africa, but also for the Convention in that it would 
finally become a legally binding, internationally recognised 
document, further contributing to the OAU's mission to prevent 
the African continent from becoming a toxic dumping ground for 
unwanted wastes. For South Africa however, ratifying the 
Convention would also be of great political significance, given 
its checkered past, and future role that it has to play as one 
of Africa's superpowers. Consequently serious consideration 
should be given to adopting Bamako, if not for environmental 
reasons, then for political ones. 
comparative Analvsis of Basel and Bamako 
The main difference between the two Conventions is that Basel 
regulates the international trade in hazardous waste while 
Bamako bans its importation onto the African continent. The 
latter Convention does, however, allow for the intra-African 
trade in such waste as well as explicitly allowing for its 
export. This latter provision, however, seems to lack any form 
of real significance since it is highly unlikely that those 
countries expressly prohibited from exporting waste to Africa 
will be willing to except Africa's hazardous waste products when 
they themselves are trying so desperately to get rid of their 
own. 
35 twenty-three as of August 1992. 
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With respect to trade generally, both Conventions seek to 
introduce a regulatory regime on hazardous waste, in fact many 
of the provisions are identical, and, because of these 
similarities one assumes that the differences that do exist 
between the Conventions are the result of the OAU's 
dissatisfaction at Basel's treatment of the subjects over which 
they differ. 
Basel provides that hazardous waste cannot be exported to, or 
imported from, a non-party state. 36 The effectiveness of this 
provision, however, is somewhat watered down by article ll which 
allows for parties to the Convention to enter into bilateral, 
multilateral or regional agreements with either party or non­
party states for the transboundary movement of such wastes. 
Bamako also provides for bilateral or multilateral agreements 
between parties and non-parties, but states further that such 
agreements may not derogate from the environmentally sound 
management of hazardous waste as required by the Convention. 37 
This further supports the Bamako ban by allowing such agreements 
only for hazardous wastes generated within Africa, thereby 
guaranteeing that if non-signatories were to import waste into 
Africa it could not be exported to the rest of continent. This 
is an important precaution in that if a non-signatory was to 
import waste as a raw material or for recycling, then, following 
such use, that country would be prevented from disposing of the 
wastes in other African nations. 38 
36 Article 4 ( 5) 
37 Article 11 (1) . 
38 Donald 433. 
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The Bamako ban obliges parties to it to ban completely the 
import of hazardous waste into Africa by all contracting 
parties. It also requires the parties to take the appropriate 
legal and administrative measures to ensure the effectiveness of 
the ban. 39 Any such importation is both an illegal and criminal 
act�, and is regarded as such against both Africa and African 
people generally. From a South African perspective the statement 
made by Dr .Dawie de Villiers, the Minister of Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism, at the Consultative Conference on National 
Environmental Policy on 17 & 18 August, 1995, that there would 
be a complete ban on the import and export of hazardous waste, 
is the initial step towards fulfilling such an obligation, 
providing however that South Africa ratifies the Convention 
first. 
In summary then, while the underlying philosophy behind Basel is 
to regulate rather than proscribe the hazardous waste trade, and 
thereby provide a regulatory framework for its transboundary 
movement, Bamako seeks to prevent the African continent from 
becoming a dumping ground for the First World's unwanted waste. 
Bamako also recognises the strict liability of hazardous waste 
generators for damage caused by their wastes while Basel 
conveniently avoids this issue. Bamako promotes open 
dissemination of information relating to the movement and 
disposal of waste via mandatory disclosures and an active 
Secretariat. Basel, on the other hand, says nothing of such 
disclosures and its Secretariat is more passive. The regulatory 
requirements governing the movement of hazardous waste are 
generally more limiting under Bamako than under Basel, and, 
whereas Bamako emphasises clean production methods and the 
relocation of industries to Africa that use such processes, 
39 Article 11. The import ban applies to all wastes, whether 
they be for disposal or recycling. 
40 Article 4(1) 
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Basel does not address industry relocation directly. 41
Scope, Definitions and Terminology 
Article 1 provides for the scope of the Basel Convention but 
this has to be read with article 2(1) which defines the concept 
of waste. Article 1 refers to both 'hazardous' and 'other 
waste', a distinction evident throughout the entire Convention. 
What constitutes 'hazardous waste' is determined by referring to 
Annex I of the Convention, however, it will only qualify as 
hazardous if it contains certain characteristics listed in Annex 
III. 
'Other waste' is defined in Annex II and the only substances 
falling within this category are 
* waste collected from households, and
* residues arising from the incineration of household wastes.
Bamako's application is similarly determined by reference to 
article 1, its general definition provision, and article 2, its 
scope. It follows the same pattern as Basel in defining 
hazardous waste and its annexes are identical barring one 
important aspect: Bamako does not specify household waste or 
residue resulting from their incineration in a separate annex as 
in Basel42 , instead they are included in Annex I as wastes which 
qualify as hazardous. The respective definitions however do not 
seek to restrict the definition of hazardous waste in that both 
Conventions allow for the inclusion of other waste ie: any other 
waste defined as hazardous by the domestic legislation of states 
party to the respective Convention falls within the definition 
41 Donald 432. 
42 Annex 2. 
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of hazardous waste within that Convention. 43 
Both Conventions exclude waste derived from the normal operation 
of ships.« This is covered by other international 
conventions.� However, while Basel specifically excludes 
radioactive waste46 it is expressly included by Bamako47 , even 
though it may be controlled by other international agreements. 
From a South African perspective this is an important provision, 
given the fact that the country does have a nuclear reactor. 
And, although this field is governed by the International Atomic 
Energy Agency's (IAEA) Codes of Practice48, if South Africa was 
to ratify the Convention and it entered into force, this 
provision could act as a further deterrent against any attempts 
to profit from such an illegal trade. 
The terminology of the Conventions' definitions does have 
practical implications. For example, the transportation of toxic 
substances to or through a country over which either Convention 
exercises jurisdiction may not fall within the scope of the said 
Convention, in that it may not constitute hazardous waste. A 
local example is that of Thor Chemicals, where it was found that 
spent mercury catalysts were imported by the company to be re­
processed as a raw material and thus did not qualify as 
a Basel article 2(1) 
Bamako article 2(1) (b) 
� Basel article 1(4) 
Bamako article 2(3) 
45 See for example the Convention on the Prevention of Marine 
Pollution By Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (London Dumping 
Convention}, 1972. 
� Article 1(3)&(4) 
47 Article 2 (3)
48 IAEA Code of Practice on the International Transboundary 
Movement of Radioactive Waste as adopted by the General 
Conference GC(XXXIV)/Res/530 of 21 September 1990. Reprinted in 
Kwiatkowska 70-75. 
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hazardous waste. And, even if South Africa had been a party to 
Basel at the time it would still have allowed the shipments, 
especially in light of its recycling provision. 49 
As far as geographical scope is concerned, both Conventions 
prohibit the export of hazardous waste south of sixty Degrees 
South Latitude, the Antarctic Treaty Area. 
General Prohibitions 
Both Conventions acknowledge the sovereignty of all party­
states. Included in this, is the right of the parties to 
prohibit, not only the entry of waste into their territories, 
but also its transboundary movement. From here on Bamako 
contains certain provisions not contained in Basel. More 
specifically, it prohibits parties from dumping hazardous waste 
into any area of the sea, be it under coastal state jurisdiction 
or on the high seas, even though dumping at sea is governed by 
the London Dumping Convention of 1972. Such dumping is illegal 
and parties must pass necessary national legislation, conforming 
with the relevant international agreements, to prevent it. 50
These are important provisions given the fact that South Africa 
is a coastal state, and as such, this is a necessary provision 
that must be included in any future municipal Act governing 
hazardous waste in South Africa. Bamako also imposes controls on 
non-party carriers which convey hazardous waste through maritime 
zones subject to coastal state jurisdiction.st
49 Article 4 (9) (b). 
50 Article 4 ( 2) (a) 
51 Article 4 (2) . 
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Apart from the ban on importing hazardous waste onto the 
continent Bamako also focuses on the control of hazardous waste 
generated within Africa. 52 These obligations are not only 
limited to controlling transboundary movements in Africa but 
also impose duties on parties regarding the generation and 
disposal of waste exclusively within a party's territory. This 
is a serious inroad into the concept of sovereignty and an 
approach not found in Basel. 
Regulation of Trade in Waste 
Basel imposes a general prohibition on exporting waste to party 
states that have prohibited such import53 , as well as 
prohibiting export to states who have not consented in writing 
to such importation. 54 Export is also prohibited where 
notification procedures and documentation requirements have not 
been complied with. 55 Bamako has similar provisions. No export 
may take place where a party state has expressly prohibited such 
import in its national legislation56 , conversely no export may 
occur where the state of import has not specifically consented 
to the import in writing (where it has not actually banned such 
import) . 57 
52 Article 4 ( 3)
53 Article 4 (1) (b) 
54 Article 4 (1) (c) 
55 Article 4 ( 4)
56 4 (3} (i} 
57 Article 4 (3) (s) 
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Furthermore, Basel contains a provision in apprehension of 
Bamako58 which provides that no waste may be exported to a 
country belonging to an economic and\or political integration 
organization which has prohibited, by legislation, waste imports 
or where there is reason to believe that such waste will not be 
managed in an environmentally sound manner. By accession to the 
OAU, this provision could further strengthen any prohibition of 
the waste trade to and from South Africa. 
Bamako contains similar provisions in this regard, that is, 
hazardous waste may not be exported to states where 
* the country does not have the facilities available to
dispose of or treat the waste in an environmentally sound
manner, and
* the exporting country has not satisfied itself that the
waste is to be managed in that manner in the importing
state and state of transit.�
When one looks closer at both Conventions one finds subtle yet 
important differences. For example, Basel uses a 'reason to 
believe' standard, implying that it is the state of mind of the 
exporter, and not the actual conditions in the importing country 
that is of consequence to the final decision whether to import 
or not.� In contrast, Bamako focuses on the facilities 
available in the importing state. If these are inadequate (for 
the environmentally sound treatment or disposal of hazardous 
waste) then an exporter cannot ship the wastes to that country. 
So, not only must there be the requisite facilities, but the 
exporting state also has to satisfy itself that the importing 
state has the capacity to handle the waste. 
5R Article 4 (2) (e)
59 Art i c 1 e 4 ( 3) ( i) & ( j ) . 
60 See also article 4 (2) {g) 
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One of the more important consequences of the drafting of both 
of the Conventions is their prioritisation of the environment 
through the concept of 'environmentally sound management of 
hazardous wastes.' In both Conventions this is defined as 
follows -
'taking all practical steps to ensure that hazardous waste 
is managed in a manner which will protect human health and 
the environment against the adverse effects that may result 
from such wastes.'M 
Kummer62, however, criticizes this definition saying that it is 
too open-ended and suggests that a more comprehensive definition 
be introduced so as to avoid any major loopholes that may arise. 
Furthermore, the definition is phrased in general terms and 
fails to specify the criteria necessary to help the exporting 
and importing countries determine whether the shipment complies 
with this requirement or not. 63 During the build-up to Basel, 
the African delegates proposed a more stringent standard for 
waste exports but this was rejected, largely due to the 
continuous pressure from the United States and other exporting 
countries. The proposed standard would only have allowed exports 
if they were to be handled and disposed of in the importing 
country in no less strict a manner than would have been required 
in the exporting country. This standard would have vastly 
reduced the hazardous waste trade, but was too far reaching to 
be acceptable to the leading waste exporting countries. 
Furthermore, given the fact that this 'no less strict' standard 
was turned down by the delegates at Basel it is surprising that 
it was not included in Bamako instead of the 'environmentally 
fil Basel article 2(8) 
Bamarko article 1(10) 
� K.Kummer 'The International Regulation of Transboundary 
Traffic in Hazardous Waste: The 1989 Basel Convention' (1992) 41 
International Comparative Law Quarterly 530, 541-2. 
63 Abrams 828. 
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sound waste management' standard. This problem is, however, 
somewhat overcome by requiring the exporting state to determine 
whether the importing state has the capacity to handle the 
consignment of hazardous waste. 
The above standard, as applied in Basel, leaves uncertain the 
critical issue of whether compliance with it is applicable to 
the exporting country even after the importing country has 
consented to the shipment. The standard requires the competent 
authorities of the exporting country to make an independent 
case-by-case assessment of the acceptability and environmental 
soundness of the proposed site and method for the treatment, 
storage and disposal of the wastes in question.M Moreover, the 
fact that the wastes are destined for reuse or disposal outside 
the national jurisdiction of the exporti�g country limits the 
extent to which its officials can independently investigate the 
appropriateness of the proposed treatment, disposal method or 
location, unless they are specifically requested to do so by the 
importing country. 65
Furthermore, once an importing country has consented to receive 
a waste shipment, it could be argued that, apart from regulating 
the shipment's transportation, the exporting country would have 
satisfied all of its other obligations. Discounting such a 
position, Basel's requirement of environmentally sound waste 
management implies that if this ambiguous standard is not 
satisfied, any consent given by the importing country is 
inadequate and invalid. 66 
64 Ibid. It is further submitted that this case-by-case 
determination may be hindered by allowing an exporter or 
generator to use a general notification procedure as set out in 
article 6 (6). 
65 Abrams 82 8. 





compounded further by the 




environmentally sound waste management. Nevertheless, the 
exporting country should still be obliged to prohibit the export 
of hazardous waste, in spite of any consent by the importing 
country67 , where it is convinced that the wastes will not be 
handled and disposed of in the correct manner in the proposed 
country of import. This obligation should not only be founded on 
the knowledge of waste management but also on a moral and legal 
responsibility to prevent the unsafe disposal of waste from 
causing serious environmental damage in the importing state. 
Otherwise, to allow such a shipment would constitute a violation 
of the fundamental right to an environment adequate for health 
and well-being as contained in the Stockholm Declaration. M
Related to this is the fact that transboundary movement can only 
take place, under Bamako, if the exporting country does not have 
the necessary technical capacity and facilities/disposal sites 
itself to dispose of the waste in an environmentally sound 
manner. 69 Bamako then takes the process one step further by 
setting 
nutshell, 
out desirable waste management practices.� In a 
these goals outline clean production methods rather 
than a permissible emissions approach. The obligation is to the 
product's entire lifecycle, and Glazewski71 submits that they 
reflect the cradle-to-grave approach and as a result are in 
keeping with the general philosophy of Integrated Environmental 
ITT This may be seen as a serious inroad into the sovereignty 
of the importing country but when human health and the 
environment are both at stake it is submitted that the duty to 
monitor waste treatment and disposal far outweighs any possible 
intrusion on state sovereignty that such a duty may entail. 
68 See n 8 -11 and accompanying text supra. 
� Article 4(3) (n) (i) 
70 Article 4 (3) (f) 
71 at 244. 
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Management (IEM} in South Africa. 
Bamako contains rules regulating the intra-African movement of 
hazardous waste72 and they are comparatively more stringent than 
the similar provisions found in Basel. Regulations in article 6 
make it more difficult to ship wastes, and easier to monitor the 
shipments. Article 6(6) requires shipment specific notification 
even where hazardous wastes having the same characteristics are 
shipped regularly to the same disposer. This is in sharp 
contrast to Basel which allows an exporter to obtain general 
notification for multiple shipments of waste. 73
Furthermore, Bamako limits the points and ports of entry of 
hazardous waste imports74 thereby allowing the severely limited 
regulatory resources of a party-state to be focused on these 
points only. Restricting the points of entry makes it 
presumptively illegal to possess hazardous wastes at national 
borders beyond those designated points.� These provisions would 
be of major importance given South Africa's status as a coastal 
state. To include them in a municipal Act would not only 
restrict the possible points of entry and exit of hazardous 
waste to and from South Africa, but also help alleviate the 
pressure on its enforcement agents in trying to counter the 
illegal shipments as well. Basel contains no such limit on the 
points and ports of entry. 
72 Article 6. 
TI Basel article 6(6). 
74 Article 6 {7)
75 Donald 437.
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Transit state consent is another of Bamako's provisions that 
maintains a more strict form of control than that of Basel. The 
latter allows shipments through transit states without written 
consent if they waive that right. Consent is waived 60 days 
after the exporting nation has notified the transit state of the 
proposed transboundary shipment. 76 The former, on the other
hand, requires written consent for transit. Thus transboundary 
movement cannot occur until the exporting country has received 
the transit state's written consent.77 In other words the right 
to consent cannot be waived, and applies mutatis mutandis to 
transit through non-party states. 78
Bamako also exerts more control over hazardous waste movements 
than Basel by expanding the definition of management beyond that 
of Basel's. In the definitions section of Basel79 management is 
defined as -
'the collection , transport and disposal of hazardous 
wastes, including after-care of disposal sites.' 
The Bamako definition, however, is also defined to include the 
'prevention and reduction of hazardous wastes, 
'treatment either for disposal or re-use.'w 
storage' and 
This, it is 
submitted, would seem to· indicate Bamako's desire for the 
cradle-to-grave approach towards hazardous waste and its 
management, with the inclusion of the concept of clean 
production methods in the attainment of this goal. In striving 
to fulfil this wider definition Bamako prohibits the 
transportation, storage and disposal of waste unless the persons 




80 Article 1 ( 3)
43 
doing so are authorised to perform such operations. 81 In 
contrast, Basel's requirements only cover transportation and 
disposal82 , and one need look no further than Thor Chemicals for 
South Africans to realise that storage of imported waste cannot 
only be hazardous, but also fatal. 
Signatories to Bamako become subject to the treaty when they 
operate facilities that generate hazardous wastes, even before 
the hazardous wastes are generated. Furthermore, the obligation 
for hazardous waste management continues after the waste is in 
storage, or when it has been recycled. In contrast, under Basel 
neither industries generating hazardous wastes, nor wastes in 
storage are subject to control until the wastes are placed in 
transboundary movement.� This further highlights the 
differences in approach taken by the two Conventions: Basel 
seems to aim for a more end-of -pipe form of regulation while 
Bamako tends towards a more cradle-to-grave perspectiveM , an 
approach which has also been mooted under the guise of 
Integrated Pollution Control (IPC) in south Africa. 
If a transboundary shipment of hazardous waste under Bamako 
cannot be completed within the terms of the waste movement 
contract, then the exporting country is under a duty to reimport 
the waste unless alternative arrangements can be made for its 
environmentally safe disposal within a maximum period of ninety 
days85 • Basel also has this ninety-day requirement but allows 
the states concerned to extend this deadline if they agree.� 
There is no upper limit to this 'extension by agreement' and as 
81 Art i c 1 e 4 ( 3 ) ( m) { i ) . 
� Article 4(7) (a) 
83 Donald 43 7. 
114 Article 4 (3) (g) clearly states that clean production 
methods shall not include end-of-pipe pollution controls. 
85 Article 8. 
86 Article 8. 
44 
such affords the exporting country an eleventh-hour escape route 
with which to try and delay their obligation to re-import. Basel 
also allows wastes defined as illegal traff ic87 either to be 
taken back by the exporting state, or to be otherwise disposed 
of in accordance with the provisions of the Convention. This 
must take place within thirty days or an agreed upon time 
period. 88 Bamako on the other hand states that wastes identified 
as illegal traffic have to be taken back by the export state 
within thirty days. And, as with the duty to re-import of 
article 8, there are no exceptions.M 
Both Conventions include similar provisions obliging parties to 
take appropriate measures to ensure that 
generation of hazardous wastes be reduced to a minimum, 
social, technological and economic factors be taken into 
account, 
* their transboundary movement is similarly reduced (note -
no such provision exists in Bamako),
87 Article 9 (1) of both Conventions defines a transboundary 
movement of hazardous waste to be illegal traffic in any of the 
following instances: 
(a) without proper notification to all states concerned, or
(b) without proper consent from all states concerned, or
(c) consent obtained through falsification, misrepresentation or
fraud, or
(d) a shipment that does not conform in a material way to the
documents, or
(e) that results in deliberate disposal of hazardous waste in direct
contravention of either Convention and general principles of
international law.
88 Article 9 (2).
89 What has been suggested about Basel's 'snowballing' 
capabilities in article 8 can also be extended to article 9(2). 
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* adequate treatment and disposal facilities for the
environmentally sound management of hazardous waste be
provided (note - Basel refers only to treatment while
Bamako refers to both), and
* appropriate steps should be taken by managers to
prevent\minimize the consequences of managing waste, and if
this is not possible, to minimize its consequences to
humans and the environment. �
Prior Informed Consent Procedure (PIC) 
PIC is fundamental to both Conventions and becomes operational 
whenever transboundary movement of hazardous waste is proposed. 
The exporting state has to provide detailed information of any 
transboundary movement to all states concerned, including 
transit states. 91 The importer and transit state92 may then 
deny, consent to, with or without conditions, or request 
additional information about the proposed waste shipment. No 
transboundary movement may occur until either of the 
aforementioned states consent in writing to the import. More 
importantly, however, is the fact that the exporting country has 
to receive evidence of a contract between the exporter and 
disposer of the waste concerned. Altogether, a greater onus is 
placed on the exporter than would have been the case under 
customary law . 
90 Basel article 4 ( 2) (a) - (d) 
Bamako article 4 (3) (c) - (e) . 
� Basel article 6 
Bamako article 6. 
92 Transit states not party to either Convention also have 
the right to deny, consent to, consent to with conditions or 
request further information about the proposed transboundary 
movement of hazardous waste. 
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If consent is given and transboundary movement has been 
authorized then a number of provisions have to be complied with 
* only authorized persons\corporations within the state
concerned may transport, store or dispose of hazardous
waste,
* the wastes in question must be labelled, packaged and
transported in accordance with generally accepted
international rules and standards, and
* transportation must be accompanied by a movement document
which must contain the information set out in the relevant
annexures to the Conventions. 93
Any contravention of the above provisions is deemed to be 
illegal traffic in hazardous waste� and party states are 
obliged to enact municipal legislation that makes non-compliance 
with such provisions an offence.� Where there has been illegal 
traffic both Conventions oblige the exporting country to re­
import the waste.� Notwithstanding the above provisions, there 
is also a specific duty on the exporting country to re-import 
the waste where the conditions laid down by the respective 
Convention have not been complied with.� Finally, there is an 
obligation on states to inform all other states concerned if an 
93 Basel article 4 ( 7) (a) - (c) and Annex V B 
Bamako article 4(3) (ml (i)-(iii) and Annex IV B. 
� Basel article 9(l} 
Bamako article 9(l}. 
% Basel article 9(5} 
Bamako article 9(1). 
96 Basel article 9 (2), Bamako article 9 (l). On illegal 
traffic and duty to re-import see n 86-88 and accompanying text 
supra. 
� Basel article 8 
Bamako article 8. 
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accident occurs during the transboundary movement of a shipment 
of w aste98•
?IC attempts to ensure that the recipients of hazardous waste 
have all the information they need to make an informed and 
reasoned consent, and to allow the status of the hazardous 
wastes to be accurately monitored at all times.� It is, 
however, not as comprehensive and effective as it should be100 , 
and as a procedure it could be strengthened if the following 
amendments were made 
* exporting countries should have the responsibility not only
to transmit notification of the proposed export to the
competent authority in the importing country, but also to
provide information describing its domestic disposal
regulations and any special restrictions relevant to that
particular shipment101 • This, it is submitted, would not
only assist the importing country in evaluating the
proposed shipment with respect to its own laws, but also
assist it in achieving the environmentally safe management
of the waste as well.
if the exporting country is not satisfied with any 
information supplied in the notification document, by the 
exporter or importer of waste, the exporting country should 
prevent the export of the waste until it has received the 
necessary information required by the said document, 
regardless of any consent that may have been given by the 
importing country. This would be especially important if the 
exporting country and the exporter were one and the same. In 
such a situation transparency would be essential in order to 
98 Basel article l3 (1)





ensure that proper notification was obtained. In other 
words, for this suggestion to be successfully implemented it 
is submitted that the State should also be bound. 
* PIC should also provide the importing country with the right
to withdraw its consent if new information on the waste
comes to light or if the shipment does not actually
correspond with the document accompanying it102 • 
the re-importation duty in the case of illegal traffic 
should also be applied if there has been a justifiable 
revocation of consent and the shipment has already taken 
place. 
Those who criticise the Prior Informed Consent system argue that 
the consent procedure would be nothing more than bureaucratic red 
tape, as well as impractical in its application. To counter this, 
it is submitted that such an argument is nothing more than trying 
to cut as many corners as possible in search for the extra profit 
that would accompany an increase in the waste trade. Furthermore, 
if there is regrettably going to be an international trade in 
waste then the more environmental safeguards the better since the 
threats involved in such trade far outweigh the benefits, which 
are purely economic and extremely short-term103 • 
tm A similar provision is available in declaring waste to be
illegal traffic, but this is only applicable for a transboundary 
shipment once consent has been obtained. And, even in this case 
the situations under which this can occur are very specific. 
103 The greater the costs involved in the international waste 
trade the more incentive there should be to either stop producing 
waste completely by adopting cleaner production methods, or, make 
use of the disposal facilities at home. 
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Both Conventions recognise the need for transmission of necessary 
information in order to control the movement of waste. 104 Both 
Basel and Bamako require the transporting documents to clearly 
state the potential effects of the proposed movement on human 
health and the environment105, and both require the disclosure of 
information about illegal shipments and accidents but their 
approaches are different. Bamako requires all parties 'to forward 
as soon as possible, all information relating to such illegal 
hazardous waste import activity to the Secretariat.' 106 In 
contrast, Basel merely requires that parties should 'cooperate in 
activities ... directly and through the Secretariat ... in the 
dissemination of information on the transboundary movement of 
hazardous waste ... to achieve the prevention of illegal 
traffic.' 107 At first glance there may not seem to be any 
significant difference between these two provisions but the 
difference does become evident once one compares notification 
procedures. Both Conventions require parties to notify affected 
states in the event of an accident involving the shipment or 
disposal of hazardous waste, implying that the nation responsible 
for it must monitor it. 108 Unfortunately, Basel qualifies its 
requirement by stating that 'affected parties shall be informed 
whenever an accident comes to a party's knowledge.' Bamako on the 
other hand states that parties shall 'ensure that ... those states 
are immediately informed' regardless of when it comes to their 
knowledge. 
104 Basel article 13 
Bamako article 13. 
� Basel article 4(2) (f) 
Bamako article 4(3) (u). 
106 Art i c 1 e 4 ( 1 ) ( a} . 
107 Article 4 ( 2} (h) . 
tM Basel article 13(1) 
Bamako article 13(1) 
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Finally, probably the most significant difference in the 
obligations to provide information, is with respect to a party's 
responsibility in the event of knowledge of another party's 
breach of the treaty. 1� Under Bamako if a party knows of another
party's breach it has to report the breach to the Secretariat, 
whereas under Basel, if a party is aware of such a breach it may 
inform the Secretariat110• In other words Bamako makes such a 
duty mandatory while under Basel it is only discretionary. 
Furthermore, parties to Bamako have to submit information on 
hazardous waste production within their national boundaries to 
the Secretariat so that it can formulate policy on an hazardous 
waste audit_ w Basel contains no such provision. Party states 
also have to ensure that exporters in their country periodically 
review the possibilities of decreasing their production of 
hazardous waste and reducing their pollution potential . 112 
Moreover, they also have to ensure that transboundary movement is 
kept to a minimum and that human health and environmental well­
being are not affected by such movement. 
Finally, in addition to the above, all parties must cooperate 
with one another and with the relevant African organizations to 
improve and achieve the environmentally sound management of 
hazardous waste . 113
109 Donald 440. 
110 Basel article 19.
Bamako article 19.
111 Article 4 (3) (a) 




The roles of the two Secretariats differ markedly. 1M Basel's is
more passive while Bamako's is more active. Both Secretariats are 
expected to communicate with the party-states, but Bamako's must 
also communicate with the Dumpwatch115 as well as inter­
governmental and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) which may 
provide assistance in implementing the convention. 116 As already
mentioned above, hazardous waste generators are required to 
submit reports to the Bamako Secretariat disclosing the wastes 
they have produced in order for the Secretariat to prepare a 
complete hazardous waste audit . 117 The audit not only provides 
basic information such as types and volumes of waste, but is also 
seen to be a source of policy-making in that generators are 
required to submit statistics, compiled by them on the effects on 
human health and the environment caused by the generation, 
transportation and disposal of hazardous wastes .118 Basel, 
unfortunately, contains no mention of an hazardous wastes audit. 
lM Article 16 of both Conventions sets out the functions of 
the Secretariat. 
115 Dumpwatch is established by article 5 (4) and although its 
functions are not explained, its role is to act as a go-between 
for government and non-government organisations (NGOs). The first 
Dumpwatch was established by the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) in 1988 by Resolution A/RES.1/6/88 25 
June, 1988, to 'ensure an effective establishment of a system of 
surveillance to ensure that the West African sub-region is kept 
free of nuclear and industrial waste.' The OAU recognised the 
need for such a mechanism and incorporated it into Bamako via 
Resolution 1199. See Kwiatkowska 959 & 970. 
116 Bamako article 16 {l) (e). 
117 Article 4 (3) (a) . 
118 Article 13 (3) (d). The only possible drawback to this 
requirement is that the information is gathered by the generator 
itself and not, more preferably, by an independent third-party. 
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Bamako also has a mandate to verify allegations of breaches of 
any of the obligations contained in the Convention and to submit 
a report to all its parties. 119 The Basel Secretariat, on the
other hand, is merely required to submit relevant information to 
the parties. 120 Moreover, Bamako's Secretariat aids in 
implementing the clean production methods advocated in the 
Convention in that it has to review systemically, the transfer of 
polluting technologies to Africa and report on this to the 
Conference of Parties. 1n There is no similar provision in Basel.
An active Secretariat is imperative for the successful policy of 
disclosure of information to protect the African countries. Due 
to the generally limited environmental infrastructure and lack of 
experience in dealing with hazardous waste, of which South Africa 
is no exception, it is essential that such a body collects and 
distributes this information. Through the waste audit the 
Secretariat can discover problem areas and highlight the need to 
correct them, as well as ensure that they do not occur again in 
the future. One of its most important functions however, is its 
obligation to communicate with NGOs. 122 This is imperative where 
African governments are either unable or unwilling to collect and 
distribute information on hazardous waste. An active Secretariat 
would, therefore, contribute towards the inability of many 
African countries to monitor the waste trade effectively . 123 
119 Article 19. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Article 4 (3) (h). 
122 Article 16 (1) (e) . 
123 A perfect example of this is the Koko dumping saga in 
Nigeria, where the government only found out about the illegal 
shipment, when Nigerian students in Italy, wrote to their 
government after reading about the export in a local Italian 
newspaper. 
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The reason why Basel rejected an active Secretariat was the 
expense that would have had to be incurred in establishing it. 
This, it is submitted, would be a significant hindrance to 
Bamako's Secretariat once the Convention enters into force, 
especially given the dire straits that most African economies are 
in at the present moment. The financial argument could be one of 
the reasons why South Africa may refrain from ratifying Bamako 
since, given its relative economic superiority compared with the 
majority of other African states, it would be required to 
contribute more to the funding of the Secretariat than its 
African neighbours. This is the same situation as the United 
States and the Basel Convention and may be one of the reasons why 
it has yet to ratify that Convention. 1u
Clean Production Methods 
The concept of cleaner production methods ( CPM) is part of 
Bamako's adoption of precautionary measures towards prevention of 
pollution and release of substances that may have a harmful 
effect on humans and the environment.us CPM, itself, is 
concerned with means of production or industrial systems which 
avoid, or eliminate the generation of hazardous wastes and 
hazardous products' within the African continent. 126 This is an 
important principle in that even if all shipments of waste to 
Africa were stopped, dirty production methods, such as that of 
Thor Chemicals, could still be relocated with the result that 
production and disposal of hazardous wastes on the continent 
would still continue. Bamako enhances this ideal by declaring 
124 Jenny Hall interview 17 November, 1995. Attorney and 
South African representative to the Third Conference of the 
Parties in Geneva 22 September, 1994. 
125 Article 4 (3) (f) . The precautionary approach includes 
methods such as raw material selection, usage and disposal and 
is intended to reduce waste by looking at the products entire 
life cycle and not just single sections of the process. 
126 Article 1 (5). 
54 
end-of-pipe solutions to be unsuited in the attainment of clean 
production methods. 127
In implementing these methods Bamako requires its Secretariat to 
systematically review the transfer of polluting technologies to 
Africa. 128 Unfortunately, the Secretariat has no authority to 
prevent such transfers other than by reporting to the Conference 
of Parties on any such transfers. On the other hand, although 
Basel does recognise the need to reduce the generation of waste 
to a minimum, it says nothing of clean production methods nor 
restricts in any way the relocation of 'dirty' industries to 
developing nations . 129 It nevertheless does require cooperation 
between nations 'in the development and implementation of new 
environmentally sound low-waste technologies and the improvement 
of existing technologies with a view to eliminating ... the 
generation of hazardous wastes' 1�, but this is further qualified
in that it promotes these technologies only 'as far as 
practicable.' 131
127 Article 4 (3) (g) 
128 Article 4 (3) (h) 
129 A few months after the UK government gave Thor an 
ultimatum to stop its mercury chemicals production or face 
prosecution for unsafe worker conditions, it closed down its 
operations in Margate, Kent, and relocated all of its mercury 
compound production facilities to Cato Ridge, South Africa. At 
the time South Africa was not a signatory to Basel, but this is 
irrelevant since the Convention contains no control over such 
relocation. However, had South Africa been a signatory to Bamako, 
and the Convention was in force, Thor's relocation could have 
been prevented and the lives of the workers saved. For a 
discussion on Thor Chemicals see Chapter III supra. 
130 Art i C 1 e 10 ( 2 ) ( C ) •
m Ibid. 
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The use and application of clean technologies is an important 
provision of Bamako, and something that is missing in Basel, 
since it acknowledges the fact that hazardous waste control 
policies need to address the practices that generate the wastes, 
as well as the wastes themselves. 132 By adopting clean production 
methods Bamako formalizes Africa's pleas that, despite the need 
for investment and economic development, this should not take 
place at the expense of the environment and the well-being of the 
African People. 
Investment for industrialisation projects is likely to come from 
developed nations and international organisations like the World 
Bank. If these investors were to include clean production methods 
as part of their criteria in the granting of a loan, the 
temptation to transfer hazardous waste-generating industries to 
developing countries would be greatly reduced. Furthermore, the 
developed nations would be able to prevent their own industries 
from avoiding local regulations and transferring abroad. Not only 
would relocation lure jobs and income away from the developed 
nation, but the relocating company would also gain a competitive 
advantage over those staying behind. 














environmentally sound management of hazardous wastes, and by 
adopting these methods Bamako helps contribute to increasing 
environmental consciousness and the ideal of a waste-free 
continent. 
132 Donald 456. 
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Liability 
This is a particularly significant difference between the two 
Conventions. Basel deliberately side-steps the issue and merely 
provides for consultation between parties to adopt 'as soon as 
practicable' rules and procedures governing 'liability and 
compensation for damage resulting from the transboundary movement 
and disposal of hazardous waste.' 133 Bamako, on the other hand 
confronts it head on, but in doing so liability only covers 
accidents resulting from the transboundary movement of waste and 
not its disposal. 134 Article 4 { 3) (b) reads as follows 
'Impose strict, unlimited liability as well as joint and 
several liability on hazardous waste generators.' 
It is uncertain as to why Bamako has only covered accidents 
resulting from the transboundary movement of hazardous waste and 
not its disposal as well. It is submitted that the provision 
should be expanded to do so. Nevertheless, its liability 
provisions will hold generators liable for damage caused by their 
wastes as well as simplify the enforcement of regulations 
governing waste shipments and discourage such shipments, unless 
,,the generator is certain that the waste will be handled in an 
environmentally safe manner. 
Since nothing is said of the application of the provision to the 
legality of the shipment, it is assumed that, when read in light 
of Bamako's general intent, it applies equally to both legal and 
illegal shipments thereby nullifying any incentive to contract 
out of liability for an illegal shipment. It has been argued that 
placing liability on the generator would discourage transporters 
or disposers from taking adequate care135 and al though this might 
very well be true it is nevertheless submitted that such 
in Basel article 12. 
IM Bamako article 12. 
135 Donald 4 51 . 
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liability will still be an effective means of keeping hazardous 
waste generators in check, as well as protecting developing 
countries ill-equipped to deal adequately with the wastes 
themselves. Such strict liability, it is submitted, is justified 
for the two following reasons 
* the generators themselves will have more reason to follow up
on the people responsible for the shipment, treatment and
disposal of the waste to ensure its environmentally safe
management, and
* enforcing strict liability on the generator for any damage
caused, regardless of fault, is further incentive to adopt
clean production methods as a preferable alternative.
The Lome Convention 
Prior to the build-up of the Lome Convention many of the 
developing countries that were to be involved in its drafting 
came to realise that the provisions of the Basel Convention would 
be inadequate to protect their own special interests. 
Consequently they decided to draw up their own multilateral 
agreement to ban the importation of hazardous waste into their 
respective territories. In 1990 the African, Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) states and the members of the European Economic 
Community (EEC) signed the Lome IV Convention136 banning the 
(direct or indirect) export of all hazardous wastes from EEC 
states to ACP states and prohibiting all ACP states from 
accepting such (direct or indirect) imports from any other 
country. 137 What makes this Convention such a strong document is 
136 Fourth ACP-EEC Lome Convention, 15 December 1989. 
Reprinted in Kwiatkowska 887-893. The Convention was opened for 
signature on 22 March 1990, and as of 20 november 1991, sixty­
nine of the former European colonies and the twelve European 
states had ratified the Convention. For a detailed list of the 
ratifications see Kwiatkowska 887. 
137 Article 39 (1). 
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the fact that not only is the export of hazardous waste 
prohibited to this group of countries but these countries are 
also prohibited form accepting for import any such waste and it 
is this two-way ban that sets it apart from Basel and Bamako. The 
only exception to this ban is where an EEC state is returning 
waste to its ACP state of origin where that state had initially 
chosen to export the waste for processing. 138
Disagreement over the extent of Basel's actual ban on hazardous 
waste was the reason why its implementation was delayed until 
1992. Lome' s ban on the other hand entered into force with 
immediate effect despite the fact that the remainder of the 
Convention had not yet taken effect. Lome IV does request its 
parties to make every possible effort to ratify Basel 139, and,
even though there is a difference of opinion on the banning of 
the trade in hazardous waste between the two Conventions, there 
is unlikely to be any confrontation on this issue since article 
11 of Basel specifically allows for other international 
agreements to govern the hazardous waste trade. This Convention 
is also important from an African perspective in that until 
Bamako enters into force the African nations will be able to rely 
on its provisions to prevent the export of waste onto the 
continent. 
The fact that Bamako has yet to enter into force may not be as 
serious for the African countries as was originally thought. This 
is due primarily to the introduction of Decision II/12, which 
will be discussed in the following chapter of this paper, along 





V; TO BAN OR NOT TO BAN, THAT IS THE QUESTION. 
The controversy surrounding this issue is the main reason behind 
the OAU and other developing countries feeling betrayed by the 
Basel Convention. There are arguments both for and against 
banning the export of hazardous waste to developing countries 
but it is submitted that many of the disadvantages, proposed by 
those opposed to a ban, can be overcome by realising the serious 
human and environmental consequences that are inevitable from 
the transboundary movement of such waste. This especially is the 
case in developing countries where resources and the ability to 
deal with hazardous waste shipments are severely limited, and 
anybody who seems to think differently is surely motivated by 
greed, and the desire to avoid stringent environmental 
regulations in return for short-term economic gains. 
Advantages of a Ban 
In order for a ban on hazardous wastes to be completely 
effective in protecting the environment and human health, it has 
to adequately explain the reasons for wanting the ban in the 
first place, as well as inform the public of the negative 
effects of importing such wastes. This is especially the case in 
developing countries where foreign currency is essential and 
economic upliftment crucial. If a waste-importing nation does 
not have the requisite infrastructure, technical capacity and 
legal framework to ensure the environmentally sound handling of 
the imported wastes, then any form of international control of 
waste shipments would be little more than a smoke screen. A ban 
in this situation would be essential to prevent such countries 
from becoming targeted by unscrupulous generators, transporters 
and disposers as convenient dumping grounds for the disposal of 
their wastes. 
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If these so-called developing countries do not have the 
requisite capacity to deal with the safe handling of the wastes 
then it is even less likely that they will be able to evaluate 
the risks posed by the wastes, monitor the environment and 
remedy any problems caused by an accident or improper disposal. 
This is not only from an environmental perspective but from an 
economic one too. The clean-up costs of a waste disaster would 
be astronomical, further disabling an already cash-strapped 
economy. For example, the clean-up costs for the Love Canal 
disaster alone were $130 million and when one considers that 
Guinea-Bissau was offered $120 million a year, the equivalent of 
its Gross National Product, to accept consignments of foreign 
waste, then if these two examples were one and the same the 
Guinea-Bissau government would still have to have come up with 
another $10 million just to 'break even'. 
Given the fact that Lome IV already prohibits such imports, that 
Bamako needs just one more ratification for it to enter into 
force, and the fact that Basel can be amended to include a ban 
on the export of waste to developing states, the necessary 
instruments do, and will exist, making such a ban relatively 
simple to implement. Firstly, once it is clear that the wastes 
have not been generated in a developing country it will be just 
as obvious that such wastes cannot be disposed of there. 
Secondly, by banning waste imports this will allow the 
developing country's meagre resources to be made available for 
the regulation of local, more socially relevant, environmental 
problems, including the control of indigenous waste. 
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A simple system is particularly important for nations lacking 
the developed hazardous waste-handling infrastructures. 1 
Furthermore, opposing the import of hazardous wastes is good 
politics, not only for a developing country but also for a 
developed country, both nationally and internationally. In 
supporting a ban, developed countries will be able to gain 
support from their developing counterparts on other global 
environmental issues, and, although one would like to say that 
politics should not be included in such a controversial topic, 
the fact is that it is, and as such, should be used in the best 
possible manner to implement a ban on the export of hazardous 
wastes. 
Finally, and probably one of the most justifiable reasons for 
imposing a waste ban is that it will place full responsibility 
for the management of hazardous wastes on the industries that 
generate the waste in the developed world. This is not only 
morally justifiable but should also be legally justified, since 
the benefits associated with the production methods that 
inevitably generate the wast�s have, for the large part, 
remained in the industrialized nations. It follows therefore, 
that if the benefits remain there, then so should the wastes. 
Donald2 argues that benefits such as technological transfers, 
health care, and economic aid have accrued to the developing 
countries but these have come at some expense, and Thor 
Chemicals is proof of this. When the technology was transferred 
to Cato Ridge this was because of pending legal action in the 
UK, and not for the benefit of the local economy. And, although 
it created employment opportunities for the local population, it 
also brought with it the life-threatening hazards of mercury 
contamination and environmental degradation. If these benefits 
are to accrue to the developing countries then the relocating 
company should be under an obligation to ensure that clean 
1 Donald 446. 
2 447.
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production methods are used to the greatest possible extent, and 
that the reasoning behind the relocation is not to avoid more 
stringent environmental regulation elsewhere. Developed 
countries should not be able to transfer the, handling of a 
potentially dangerous situation to a developing country that is 
clearly ill-equipped to deal with it. Just as a pharmacist 
should not ask a drug store cashier to fill prescriptions, the 
developed nations should not ask the Less Developed Countries 
(LDCs) to handle the developed nations' hazardous wastes. 3 
Disadvantages of a Ban 
Critics argue that an import ban is an inappropriate solution to 
the problems inherent in the disposal of hazardous wastes in 
developing countries. This, it is submitted, is not a well­
founded argument, since, imposing the ban is the only realistic 
way to put an end to the toxic colonialistic attitudes with 
which many of the developed countries regard the former colonial 
nations. Critics of the ban say that it will deny the developing 
countries the opportunity of earning much-needed foreign 
exchange which could go towards alleviating poverty and disease, 
building industry and infrastructure, and helping nations become 
developed countries. 4 This, it is submitted, is a partial cover­
up for the real reason behind wanting to keep the exports going. 
And, even though the foreign exchange may help in alleviating 
the problems set out above, it still means that the effects of 
the hazardous waste trade remain externalities to the production 
process. Therefore, given that this argument is supposed to 
reveal genuine concern for the upliftment of others in need, 
should not these concerns be more focused on introducing cleaner 
production methods, preventing the production of hazardous 
wastes and educating developing nations about the potential 
risks involved in their production, instead of inducing them 
with foreign exchange to accept such wastes? 
3 Donald 44 7. 
4 Donald 447-448. 
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Furthermore, paying the developing countries money to import the 
waste is a meagre fraction of the costs involved in the 
developed country5, and, given the social and environmental 
costs of hazardous waste disposal it is doubtful whether the 
moneys paid will alleviate anything but the conscience of the 
hazardous waste generator. In effect then, the foreign exchange 
argument acts as a convenient disguise for the more astronomical 
costs avoided by the generator at home. 
Donald argues that imposing a ban on the export of waste to 
developing countries will affect the efficiency and safety of 
hazardous waste technology in these countries, since each 
country would sacrifice economic efficiency by trying to develop 
its own disposal facilities for different types of waste. 6 This 
argument does not hold water for developing countries since it 
has already been established that these nations generally lack 
the regulation, infrastructure and technical capabilities to 
efficiently deal with hazardous waste. Imposing a ban should 
only restrict the export of hazardous waste to LDCs and not the 
transfer of clean production technologies to help prevent such 
waste production. 7
5 As little as $40 per ton in some African states compared 
to $1 100 per ton in the United States. See Ch I n  8-16 and 
accompanying text. Peter 32. 
6 
448. 
7 By transferring clean production technologies to LDC's, 
developed countries would not only receive foreign exchange for 
such transfer, it would also be a positive political step towards 
relieving the tension between themselves and the LDC's in the 
polarised North-South debate. 
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Another argument against the ban that is capable of being 
countered is that, by imposing a ban developing countries may be 
preventing the development of technologies and routines to deal 
with hazardous wastes that they themselves may generate. 8 These 
technologies could be crucial if developing countries are to 
progress without destroying their environments. A simple 
response to this viewpoint is that if industrial technologies 
can be relocated to developing countries, then its difficult to 
understand why waste treatment technologies (or cleaner 
technologies for that matter) cannot also be transferred. 
The final argument against a ban is the one that has raised the 
most controversy. Bamako bans, for any reason, the importation 
of hazardous wastes onto the African Continent. 9 This includes 
recycling. Basel, unfortunately, makes provision for 
recycling. 10 The controversy is that, on the one hand, a lot of 
hazardous waste shipments have been able to avoid regulation 
through sham recycling schemes, whilst on the other, materials 
that do not have to be disposed of can be recycled resulting in 
both a reduction in costs and disposal requirements. Recycling 
can be part of the cleaner production methods and is a more 
desirable option than disposal. But, the fact is that if these 
cleaner production methods are not adopted the recycled product 
can turn out to be as dirty, if not worse than the original. 
Thus, given past experiences, where dirty technologies have been 
relocated to the developing world, any proposal to relocate 
recycling industries would have to be approached with extreme 
caution, especially if they have been relocated to avoid 
environmental regulation elsewhere. 
8 Donald 44 7. 
9 Article 4 (1) 
10 Article 4(9) (b) 
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The only form of justification, if any, for exporting waste is 
that it can be treated in a more environmentally sound manner in 
the importing nation than it can in the country of origin. In 
developing countries costs are generally lower and liability, if 
any, is generally less stringent. Unfortunately, however, the 
possibility of the disposal being carried out in an 
environmentally sound manner is also a lot lower. This factor is 
essential in defending the claim to implementing a ban in that 
it not only highlights the inadequacies inherent in most 
developing countries, but also discloses the proposals made by 
developing countries for what they really are: superficial 
claims based wholly on a need to rid themselves of their own 
unwanted wastes. 
Decision II/12 
On March 25, 1994 the signatories to the Basel Convention met in 
Geneva at the Second Conference of the Parties11 and took an 
unprecedented step, by adopting a consensus decision12 , for a 
full ban on all transboundary movements of hazardous waste from 
the twenty-five industrialised countries13 of the Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to non-OECD 
states. All parties agreed that 'transboundary movements of 
hazardous wastes from OECD to non-OECD States have a high risk 
of not constituting an environmentally sound management of 
11 Second Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the 
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of 
Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal. Geneva, 21-25 March, 1994. 
Final Decision Reprinted in Greenpeace 'Toxic Trade Update' 7.1 
(1994) 6 (hereafter referred to as Greenpeace). 
12 In international treaties the preferred means of decision 
making is by consensus. Voting is only carried out as a last 
resort. 
13 Mexico became the twenty-£ ifth member in April, 1994. 
Becoming a member might actually have backfired on Mexico, at 
least from an environmental perspective, in that it may lead to 
an increase in wastes since the ban only prohibits exports to 
non-OECD states and not between OECD states. 
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hazardous wastes as required by the Basel Convention.' 14 The ban 
is immediate for wastes bound for final disposal, and is
effective for wastes bound for recycling or recovery from 1 
January, 1998. The decision is important for two reasons -
* it marked the end of the industrialised nations exploiting
the weaker regulations and infrastructure abroad to avoid
responsibility at home.
* it was a decisive breakthrough for global environmental
democracy achieved by an unwavering coalition of Northern
and Southern, and Central and Eastern European countries. 15 
The majority of the one hundred and twenty countries in support 
of the total ban did prevail against the buying power of the 
minority opposed to the ban. 16 Not one of the non-OECD countries 
was persuaded that hazardous waste importation was a good idea, 
thereby undermining the opponents' attempts to water down or 
even prevent the ban from materializing. 
The significance of the Decision is that it finally recognised, 
and closed, the recycling loophole through which almost ninety 
percent of the hazardous waste was flowing. For the first time
in international law the parties took a clear decision that 
hazardous waste was not a 'good' suitable for free trade, but 
something to be avoided, prevented and cured, like a disease or 
a dangerous plague. 17 
14 Final Decision of the Second Conference of Parties, in 
Greenpeace 6. 




Another important divergence from the past was that the proposal 
used the words 'non-OECD' instead of the previously used term of 
'developing countries'. This was necessary to include the former 
Eastern Bloc which had been increasingly targeted as a disposal 
site since the demise of the Iron Curtain. A ban on hazardous 
wastes to just developing countries would have had little effect 
as the traders would have simply redirected their wastes to the 
economically undeveloped Eastern Bloc countries. 
Throughout the Conference the United States attempted to 
undermine the total ban. This came as a surprise to some of the 
delegates considering the fact that only a few weeks earlier the 
Clinton Administration announced that it supported a full ban on 
U.S. exports to all countries outside of North America. Given 
this unlikely turn of events, the U.S. delegation ruined a 
golden opportunity to establish itself, especially among the 
non-OECD countries, as a world leader on the environment and 
development. 
The most important aspects of Decision II/12 are as follows: 
* exports of hazardous wastes for final disposal are
prohibited. There are no exceptions, it is a total ban of
all the Basel-listed hazardous wastes.
* all transboundary shipments of hazardous wastes bound for
recycling or recovery are prohibited as of 1 January, 1998.
There are no exceptions to this ban either and it covers
all Basel-listed hazardous wastes.
* between 25 March, 1994 and 1 January, 1998 any non-OECD
state that does not have a national hazardous waste import
ban and which allows the import of such wastes for
recycling or recovery until the phase-out date should
inform the Secretariat that it would 'allow the import from
an OECD State of hazardous wastes for recycling or recovery
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operations by specifying the categories of hazardous wastes 
which are acceptable for import; the quantities to be 
imported; the specific recycling/recovery operation to be 
used; and the final destination/disposal of the residues 
which are derived from recycling/recovery operations.' 18 
* the wastes covered by the decision are those defined as
hazardous by the Convention and does not cover 'other
wastes' listed in Annex II of the Convention such as
household wastes 19, nor does it include non-hazardous waste
such as paper and glass or scrap metals.
* the ban does not affect shipments of wastes from non-OECD
to OECD states, between non-OECD states or OECD states.
One of the controversies surrounding the decision is that those 
parties who were opposed to it20, claimed that the decision did 
not constitute an amendment to the Convention and, as such, was 
beyond the scope of the Convention and therefore, not legally 
binding. If this really is the case then why did some of them 
fight so hard to undermine its implementation in the first 
place? 
18 Final Decision paragraph 3. 
19 This may be a perceived weakness in the Decision in that 
residues from the incineration of household wastes (ie: 
incinerator ash) are also excluded from the ban (since they are 
classified as other wastes), and if these residues are of a 
hazardous nature then they will still be able to be exported to 
non-OECD countries. This loophole must be closed when countries 
write their implementation legislation (ie: South Africa must 
include this category of wastes in its general import ban). 
2° Countries such as Austria, Canada, Australia in their 
closing speeches said that it did not constitute an amendment. 
While countries such as the U.S., Germany and the European 
Commission, after the adoption of the ban stated publicly that 
they did not believe the Decision to be binding international 
law. Greenpeace 7. 
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Although this seems to be a last ditch effort to keep the waste 
trade alive there are provisions in the Convention itself which 
indicate that the decision is binding -
* Basel itself requires all Parties to ban exports to
countries which have themselves banned the import of
hazardous waste21 and have informed the parties of their
decision via the Secretariat.ll In this case the decision
itself gives notice to all .the Parties, both directly and
through the Secretariat, that the non-OECD states have
agreed to ban imports from OECD states. Consequently in
terms of article 4 (1) (a) & {b), the OECD states have an
obligation to ban all exports to those countries,
* it also requires the Parties to decide at their first
meeting, on criteria to determine when there is reason to
believe that hazardous wastes will not be managed in an
environmentally sound manner, as required by the
Convention23 ,
* Decision II/12 was proposed at the first meeting as part of
those criteria. The final decision was delayed and only
adopted at the second meeting, and is now part of the
criteria required by article 4 for determining when
hazardous wastes will be managed in an environmentally
sound manner, and
21 Article 4 (1) (a) & (b) . 
22 Article 13 (2) (4) . 
23 Article 4 (2) (el . 
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* the decisions taken by the Parties satisfy the requirements
of becoming part of customary international law as they are
accepted as general practise to implement the Convention,
and are viewed by the majority of the countries to be
obligatory. 24
The claim that the Decision was not legally binding posed a 
threat to its implementation, and as a result, on 22 September 
1995, at the Third Conference of the Parties in Geneva, the 
Conference decided, by consensus, to amend the Convention so as 
to incorporate the wording of the Decision into the original 
text of the Convention.� At the Conference, the Parties decided 
to adopt the following amendment to the Convention: to insert a 
new preambular paragraph 7 recognising that 'transboundary 
movements of hazardous waste, especially to developing 
countries, have a high risk of not cons ti tu ting an 
environmentally sound management of hazardous wastes as required 
by this Convention. ' 26 Furthermore, the amendment also inserts 
a new article 4A -
1. Each Party listed in Annex VII27 shall prohibit all
transboundary movements of hazardous wastes which are
destined for operations according 
States not listed in Annex VII.
24 Greenpeace 8. 
to Annex IV A2s ' to
25 Interview with Jenny Hall, attorney and South African 
representative to the Conference, Johannesburg 17 November, 1995 
(hereafter referred to as Jenny Hall Interview). 
26 Draft Decision III/ ... Amendment to the Basel Convention 
paragraph 6. See Annex A of this document. 
v This annex contains a list of all Parties and other states 
which are members of the OECD and the EEC. 
28 This annex contains a list of operations 'which do not 
lead to the possibility of resource recovery, recycling, 
reclamation, direct re-use or alternative uses.' 
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2. Each Party listed in Annex VII shall phase out by 31 
December, and prohibit as of that date, all transboundary 
movement of hazardous wastes under Article l(i) {a)~ of the 
Convention which are destined for operations according to 
Annex IV B. 30 Such transboundary movement sha ll not be 
prohibited unless the wastes in question are characteri sed 
as hazardous under the Convention. 
Unfortunately some states, including Australia, Korea and the 
United States opposed the decision to amend the Convention. This 
brought about a simultaneous decision to recognise the soverei gn 
right of a state to enter into an article 11 agreement in terms 
of which they may import hazardous waste in accordance wi th 
guidelines to be established by the Technical Working Group." 
This again seems to be yet another attempt by those countri es 
unwilling to acknowledge and accept responsibility for their own 
waste to continue exploiting developing countries, by usi ng 
political reasoning to twist the concept of sovereignty to suit 
their own needs, while at the same time disregarding the rights 
of others. The article 11 agreement however, may be combatted by 
the fact that one of the primary provisions of the Convention is 
to prohibit the export of wastes to nations that have banned its 
import. Thus, if a nation was to ban the import of hazardous 
wastes, as the OECD did with Decision II/12, then an article 11 
agreement cannot be used to reverse such a decision. 
29 Wastes that belong to Annex I unless they do not possess 
any of the characteristics listed in Annex III. 
30 This annex contains a list of all operations which 'may 
lead to resource recovery, recycling, reclamation, direct re-use 
or alternative uses.' 
31 Draft Decision III paragraph 3; Jenny Hall Interview op 
cit n 24. 
: The most simple, yet obvious, 
Decision II/12 is by leaving 
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strategy aimed at undermining 
the ban alone and trying to 
redefine hazardous wastes. 32 The industry-backed attempts on 
this idea have taken one of two forms -
* re-defining waste bound for recycling as non-waste33 , and
* de-listing certain hazardous wastes
definitions, particularly for recycling. 34 
from Basel's 
Greenpeace claims that it has uncovered de-listing programme, in 
the form of an OECD decision granting industry a de-listing of 
certain categories of Basel-listed hazardous wastes in a 'green 
list', part of a listing system of wastes bound for recycling. 
This green-list contains known hazardous wastes such as lead and 
cadmium, which are allowed for export between OECD states with 
no environmental controls whatsoever. Greenpeace claims further 
that this is only the beginning of a greater strategy aimed at 
applying the 'green-list' to non-OECD states, in order to 
continue the export of hazardous wastes to these states, without 
any form of control, and in complete defiance of the Basel ban 
as well. It is obvious, however, that these definitions are 
incompatible with those of Basel and that they only apply to 
32 A further, but unlikely, possibility would be to invite 
non-OECD states to join the OECD, thereby circumventing a ban 
that only seeks to prohibit waste exports between non-OECD 
states. See n 13 supra and the possibility of this happening to 
Mexico. 
33 The Union of Industrial and Employers Confederations of 
Europe (UNICE) have proposed to the EU and certain member states 
that recyclable wastes, no matter how hazardous, fall out of the 
scope of environmental regulation as they are part of the 
production family, which they define as 'anything that has 
commercial value'. Greenpeace 9. From an environmental 
perspective this would be lunacy in that one would not have to 
worry about the possibility of a loophole as this would provide 
waste traders with a justified route, saying that what they were 
trading had commercial value. 
34 Greenpeace 9. 
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OECD countries since the Convention makes it clear that its 
definitions are the only ones to be used with respect to non­
OECD countries.� 
The previous discussion has focused on the controversies 
surrounding a proposed ban, as well as the implementation of 
Decision II\12. This decision, it is submitted, will be of 
extreme importance in regulating the future trade in hazardous 
waste. It will also be significant in helping a country to 
formulate its future policy and municipal legislation towards 
the regulation of hazardous waste. This will certainly be the 
case with respect to South Africa, given its present fragmented 
approach to not only hazardous waste, but also to environmental 
law in general. Consequently, it is to South Africa's policy and 
legislation governing hazardous waste that the attention of this 
paper will now turn. 
35 See n 27-29 supra, and accompanying text. 
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VI: SOUTH AFRICA. 
'I wish to add that since the end of 1990 South Africa has 
accepted no imports of dangerous waste products.' 1 
Unfortunately, this is only a half-truth and perhaps not even 
possible that it is a half-truth in that that. It is 
theoretically Thor was not importing hazardous wastes as it had 
been exempted from the apparent waste ban imposed by the South 
African government2 in 1990, since it was a bona fide
manufacturing industry that had a right to import waste. From 
this it is clear that this so-called ban was riddled with 
loopholes, and in fact, the Ministry of Environmental Affairs 
said that other companies could be granted the right to import 
hazardous waste if they intended to extract raw materials from 
it, and if they complied with South Africa's water pollution and 
industrial safety regulations. 3
The import of hazardous waste continued well beyond 1990. In 
fact on February 17, 1994, Earthlife Africa revealed that one 
hundred and sixty barrels of mercury waste were to be imported 
from Borden Chemicals and Plastics (USA), one of Thor's major 
suppliers. The shipment was due to arrive in Durban on 21 
February 1994, however, due to protests by Greenpeace and other 
environmental groups in both Louisiana and South Africa, Borden 
Chemicals was forced to recall the shipment to the United 
States. 4 The success in warding off the unwanted waste was 
rounded off by the Managing Director of Thor stating that it 
1 Interview with Dr. Colin Cameron, Director-General of the
Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, in RSA 
Review/RSA-Oorsig Vol 7 No.8 October 1994 20, 23. 
2 This ban was apparently imposed by a Ministerial 
Proclamation in September 1990. However, it was discovered that 
this Proclamation has never actually been gazetted. 
3 Lukey et al 170. 
4 Earthlife 11. 
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would cease hazardous waste imports and get out of the mercury
industry within two years.
5 This promise, however, remains to be 
realised. 
Thor Chemicals was not the final episode of what can only be 
described as the government's worst waste nightmare. In August 
1995, a planned import of fifty tons of cupric arsenic from 
Finland, via Durban into South Africa, was thwarted by the 
Environmental Justice Networking Forum (EJNF), and, to add 
insult to injury, not only was the import permit printed on a 
Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEA&T) 
letterhead, but the Department's Director-General Colin Cameron 
also admitted that he knew of the import6 , which was in breach 
of Minister de Villiers' stated policy that South Africa would 
not accept any hazardous waste. 7 Originally only an in-house 
inquiry was established to investigate the circumstances 
surrounding the foiled shipment even though there had been calls 
by the House of Assembly's Portfolio Committee for Environmental 
issues to initiate a wide-ranging inquiry into all recent 
shipments of hazardous wastes into the country, and the role 
that consultants had played in the handling of these matters. 8 
Apparently the reason for choosing an in-house investigation 
instead of an independent inquiry was that the latter would have 
been too expensive. 9 The controversy was based on evidence 
suggesting that private consultants had obtained administrative 
powers to import the shipment from Finland. Fortunately, 
however, the committee was converted into a commission following 
a statement by the committee's chairperson, Pretoria Regional 
Court President Jan Venter, that organisations and witnesses 
5 Earthlife 36. 
6 He, however, changed his tune, once both the Minister and 
Deputy-Minister claimed they knew nothing of the planned 
importation. The Star 22 September, 1995. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Weekly Mail and Guardian 22 September, 1995. 
9 Ibid. 
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were unwilling to testify. 10 The advantage of the investigation
being converted into a full commission was that this would 
authorise Venter to hear evidence under oath and allow for 
proper cross-examination. 
South Africa has in the past, in relation to the import of toxic 
wastes, been described as the 'Achilles Heel of Africa' 11, based 
largely on the fact that it legally accepted imported wastes. 
The remainder of the continent's countries have adopted a series 
of resolutions and conventions banning the import of hazardous 
wastes, including those wastes intended for recycling. South 
Africa finally ratified the Basel Convention in May, 1994 and 
there has also been considerable lobbying for it to become the 
tenth country to ratify Bamako so that it may finally enter into 
force. 12 This, however, will not make much difference unless 
South Africa is able to formulate effective policy governing all 
aspects of hazardous waste and enacting implementing legislation 
binding South Africa to the provisions of Basel and, if 
necessary, Bamako. 
South Africa produces approximately four hundred and sixty 
million tons of waste annually, and of that, two million tons is 
toxic. 13 This may sound completely insignificant when compared 
to the total global production of between three hundred and four 
hundred mil lion tons. 14 But, the truth is that South Africa's 
inability to deal with its own hazardous wastes completely 
overshadows the fact that it accounts for only half a percent of 
the world's total amount. Consequently, before one even vaguely 
10 The Star 7 November, 1995 
11 Earthlife 28. 
u In terms of article 25 of Bamako, the Convention will
enter into force on the ninetieth day after its tenth 
ratification. 
13 Muniviro Vol 12 No.1 February, 1995 8. 
14 Marbury 255. 
77 
considers any form of justification to import more one should 
focus one's attention on reducing South Africa's waste and even 
try to prevent it. 
South African Law and Policy 
There is currently no legislation fully regulating hazardous 
wastes in South Africa, in fact, at least thirty-seven Acts of 
Parliament, sixteen Provincial Ordinances and numerous local 
authority by-laws15 attempt to do so. This problem is further 
compounded by the fact that several government departments have 
jurisdiction over not only different areas of hazardous waste 16
but also environmental law in general, with a possible result 
being that one department may not know what the other is doing. 
One of the most significant of the plethora of legislation 
governing waste in South Africa is the Environment Conservation 
Act (ECA) 17• In terms of section 1 of the Act, waste is defined 
as: 
'any matter whether gaseous, liquid or solid, or any 
combination thereof originating from any residential, 
commercial or industrial or agricultural area identified by 
the Minister as an undesirable or superfluous by-product, 
emission, residue 
activity' . 18 
or remainder of any process or 
15 Jenny Hall, attorney, Lecture to the ANC Standing 
Committee on the Proposed Policy on Hazardous Waste, May 1995 
(hereafter referred to as ANC Standing Committee Lecture). 
16 For instance section 20 Environment Conservation Act 
73/1989 makes the Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry 
responsible for the issuing of permits for waste disposal sites, 
yet the Act as a whole is administered by the Minister of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism. 
17 No. 73 of 1989. 
18 Minor confusion exists here in that in terms of s 1 of the 
ECA 'Minister' means the Minister of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism, however in terms of section 20 the Minister of Water 
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This definition does not include hazardous waste and is somewhat 
watered down in that the Minister's identification of waste in 
GN 198619 excludes the following categories of waste 
* water used for industrial purposes or any effluent produced
by or resulting from such use (which is discharged in
compliance with the provisions of section 21 (1) of the
Water Act 54/156),
* any matter discharge into a septic tank or drain sewerage
system,
* building rubble used for filling or levelling purposes,
* any radioactive substance discarded (in compliance with the
provisions of the Nuclear Energy Act 92/1982),
Affairs and Forestry is responsible for the regulation and 
control of all waste disposal activities. Furthermore, in the 
section itself reference is made to both the 'Minister of Water 
Affairs & Forestry', as well as just the 'Minister'. So does this 
mean that the Minister of Water Affairs & Forestry would first 
have to confirm the identification of a waste with the Minister 
of Environmental Affairs & Tourism before setting out regulations 
for its control and disposal. If so, this is unnecessary 
bureaucracy that can so easily be avoided by clearly defining and 
streamlining the roles to be played by the relevant players. 
Consequently, it is submitted that waste management and disposal 
should only vest with the Department of Environmental Affairs &
Tourism and not with the Department of Water Affairs & Forestry. 
The only reasoning, it is submitted, for having it under the 
auspices of the latter Department in the first place is the 
potential for water pollution resulting from mismanagement of a 
waste disposal site. This, however, is only one facet of the 
entire waste cycle, and considering the fact that Policy on 
Hazardous Waste Management was issued by the Department of 
Environmental Affairs & Tourism, there has to be uniformity in 
future happenings governing waste to avoid any confusion created 
by the duplication of Ministerial, or other powers. 
19 GN 12703, 24 August, 1990. 
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* any minerals, tailings, waste rock or slimes produced by or
resulting from activities at a mine or works (as defined in
section 1 of the Mines and Works Act 27/1956), and
* ash produced by or resulting from activities at an
undertaking for the generation of electricity (under the
provisions of the Electricity Act 41/1987) . 20 
Furthermore, the Policy on Hazardous Waste Management21 defines 
waste to be 
'any material, whether solid, liquid or gaseous which is 
(i) to be discarded,
form, with or
discharged or emitted in any 
without means of control, 
treatment, reduction or compositional change; 
(ii) no longer to be used for its original purpose and
which is likely to be stored or accumulated for
three months or longer, with or without the
eventual intention of treatment or disposing,
discharging or emitting it;
20 This ash can be one of two types, either the fine dust ash 
captured by the precipitators in the smoke stacks or a more solid 
form of ash known as boiler bottom ash that is produced in the 
generation process itself. The ash is collected and combined to 
form an ash dump which is stored on site for the duration of the 
electricity generator's lifespan. Effectively then, the ash is 
merely controlled before trying to repatriate it as part of the 
natural environment. If this is not entirely possible the thinner 
dust ash will be extracted and used as an additive in the 
construction of concrete or breeze blocks. This could have 
uncertain complications depending on the toxicity of the ash and 
its possible classification as a secondary raw material. Pers 
comm. J.D. Mc Cann, Internal Consultant: Eskom Generation 
Operational Engineering, 19 December, 1995. 
21 GN 159 87 3 0 September, J.994. 
{iii) 
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sent off site for reuse, recycling, regeneration, 
alienating, treatment or disposal, or from which 
matter such processes will be extracted.' 
Thus any waste that may escape the 'net' of the ECA, if not 
subject to regulation in terms of 'other legislation', is not 
subject to any form of regulation at all.� Section 20 of the 
Act provides that waste disposal activities will be subject to 
the control of the Minister of Water Affairs, unless they are 
subject to the provisions of other legislation. And, although 
the Act may form a framework on which waste management in 
general can be based, by bringing the discordant pieces of 
legislation together, it has yet to make any real impact. 
Several reasons for this can be identified -
* although the hazardous waste policy provided for by section
2 has been formulated� it seems too general in terms and
does not take matters of regulation much further.�
* sections 22 and 23 empower the Minister to declare and
prohibit any activity that may have a detrimental effect on
the environment. Consequently the Minister is in a position
to declare the import, export or generation of hazardous
waste to be such an activity, thereby prohibiting any of 
the above from taking place. The potential for the
regulation of hazardous waste under the ECA therefore
exists but unfortunately no such activities have yet been
22 Peckham 90. 
23 Policy on Hazardous Waste Management in RG 15987 30 
September, 1994. See discussion and criticisms infra. 
� B.Peckham 'Some Thoughts on the Regulation of Hazardous 
Waste Disposal in South Africa' (1994) 1 South African Journal 
of Environmental Law and Policy 1 BS, 88 (hereafter referred to 
as Peckham) . 
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designated. 25
* the regulations provided for in terms of section 26 with
respect to waste disposal have also not been promulgated.w
The potential advantages of these are self-evident.
* as already mentioned the ECA is supposed to be a framework
piece of legislation intended to combine and coordinate the
numerous Acts, yet the authorities have decided on specific
legislation to regulate hazardous waste.v
Even though the above factors can be seen as reasons for 
inhibiting the development of the ECA it still has the potential 
to become the framework legislation that it was intended to be. 
However, this is further overshadowed by attempts to propose 
completely new legislation. This unfortunately, will create 
further areas of duplication and confusion. It is obvious, 
therefore, that the varying definitions of waste, exclusions and 
lack of a single cohesive piece of legislation governing waste 
pose a threat of untelling environmental harm. To understand the 
extent of the danger and confusion that these lacunae present, 
it is necessary to briefly examine the provisions of other 
relevant and applicable legislation. 
" One of the most important Acts is the Hazardous Substances Act28
which deals primarily with the control of hazardous substances 
and not hazardous wastes per se. The Act is administered by the 
Department of National Heal th and Population Development by 
means of declaring products to fall within one of four specified 
categories depending on their composition. In terms of the Act, 
� Peckham 89 n 12.
26 Ibid. 
27 Op cit n 14.
28 No. 15 of 1973. 
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the Minister is empowered to make regulations regarding the 
importation, transportation, dumping and other disposal of any 
hazardous substances29 as well as aspects governing the 
manufacture, packaging, storage and disposal of hazardous 
substances.m The Act does provide for the regulation of 
transportation and storage of hazardous substances31 , but the 
effectiveness of these regulations is hampered by the fact that 
they only apply to containers in excess of five hundred litres 
thereby excluding smaller containers from any form of regulation 
whatsoever. The Act also provides that regulations governing the 
disposal of hazardous substances may also be made. This, 
however, has not occurred. 32
, The Occupational Health and Safety Act33, al though not 
conventionally regarded as an environmental statute, now imposes 
a duty on employers to provide and maintain as far as reasonably 
practicable, a working environment that is safe and without risk 
to health of the employees and also to provide that persons, 
other than those employed, who may be directly affected by the 
activities of the employer are not exposed to hazards to their 
health or safety. 34 From this explanation it can be noted that 
the Act places great emphasis on the health and safety, of not 
only the employees, but also anybody that may be affected by the 
3 Section 29(1) (a). 
30 Section 29 (1) (b).
31 GN R 73 11 January, 1985. 
32 The one exception to this is the regulations contained in
GN 452 & 453 25 March 1977; GN 2777 & 2778 21 December 1984; GN 
R72 11 January 1985 which states that containers used for toxic 
substances, when disposed of on a dump must be flattened so as 
to be unusable, or, if reusable must be securely closed and only 
reused for the same substance. Jenny Hall interview, Ch V n 24 
supra. 
33 No. 85 of 1993. 
34 Jenny Hall Interview. Furthermore see Draft General Heal th 
and Safety Regulations R24 GN 16222, 20 January, 1995; 
Regulations for Hazardous Chemical Substances R1179 GN 16956, 25 
August, 1995. 
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employer's activities. And, appropriately, the onus is thus on 
the employer to ensure that its operations are conducted in 
accordance with sound environmental practises. 
The above two Acts are not the only Acts exercising control, in 
one form or other, over the regulation of hazardous materials 
but they are, it is submitted, probably the most relevant. The 
following is a list of other pieces of South African legislation 
governing the topic 
* Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Act35 - if the substance
or waste is an hazardous or offensive gas then it will fall
within the ambit of this Act, which is administered by the
Department of National Health and Population Development.
* Water Act36 - if the substance or waste is an effluent or
water then it is subject to the provision of this Act,
which is administered by the Department of Water Affairs
and Forestry.
* Dumping at Sea Control Act37 - if a substance or waste is
identified on the basis of chemical composition contained
in schedules to the Act, then it will be subject to
specific regulations prohibiting its dumping at sea.
* Nuclear Energy Act38 if the substance or waste is
radioactive nuclide or any other nuclear material then it
falls within the ambit of this Act, which is administered
by the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs.
� No. 45 of 1965.
36 No. 54 of 1956. A new Act is, however, in the process of 
being promulgated. 
37 No. 73 of 1980.
� No. 131 of 1993. 
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* Minerals Act39 - if the substance or waste is a result of
mining operations then it falls under the provisions of
this Act which is also administered by the Department of
Mineral and Energy Affairs.
* Health Act40 - if the substance or waste poses a health
threat or represents a nuisance to the people in the
surrounding area then it will fall within the ambit of this
Act, which is Administered by the Department of National
Health and Population Development.
As one can see the above list is rather expansive, and comprises 
several different government departments, which may be one of 
the reasons for explaining the confusion surrounding the 
regulation of hazardous wastes in South Africa. It is also quite 
possible that given the type of exclusions in the existing 
legislation, that a specific hazardous substance or waste could 
fall through the net completely unregulated. It is suggested, 
therefore, that a comprehensive policy on hazardous waste 
management should address the problems of fragmentation and 
legislative indecision discussed above, as well as provide a 
context for interpreting existing laws and for drafting future 
ones. 
� No. 50 of 1991. 
� No. 63 of 1977. 
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Hazardous Waste Management Policy 
On 14 May, 1993 the Department of Environment Affairs published 
its Proposed Policy on Global Environmental Change which stated 
that there was a possibility of the transference of non-green 
industry41 and that there would be little chance of South Africa 
being able to institute energy saving mechanisms until it was 
economically developed. 1994 saw the ushering in of a new 
government and with it a Policy on Hazardous Waste Management 
which was published on 30 September that same year42 , but it was 
not as successful as it had hoped, coming under fire from all 
quarters including trade unions, non government organisations 
(NGOs} and community based organisations (CBOs) .� Nevertheless, 
the Policy was documented for the following reasons 
* only twenty percent of the seven hundred chemicals used by
industry have been tested,
* thirty three percent of the chemicals have not been listed
at all,
* regulations governing the transportation of hazardous
substances only covers approximately three hundred
chemicals and are only applicable to containers in excess
of five hundred litres,
41 This is hardly surprising given the fact that the previous 
government had mandated Thor's import of mercury waste as a raw 
material. 
42 GN 159B7. During November, 1994, the Kwazulu-Natal 
Provincial Legislature's Portfolio Committee on Conservation held 
public hearings to ascertain opinion on the proposed policy. 
After the hearings the Committee unanimously rejected the plans 
to import hazardous waste into South Africa, and submitted a 
detailed report to the Department of Environmental Affairs &
Tourism in this regard. Monitor October, 1995 4. 
43 Jenny Hall Interview. 
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* there is little general awareness about the dangers and
effects of hazardous waste, and
* there are strong arguments for the contention that ad hoc
legislation cannot adequately deal with the problem of
hazardous waste effectively and efficiently, thereby 
accepting that a policy on hazardous waste was 
imperative. 44 
Provision for the Policy was made in terms of section 2 of the 
ECA, which authorises the Minister to determine general policy 
with a view to 'the protection of the environment against 
disturbance, deterioration, defacement, poisoning or destruction 
as a result of human-made structures, installation processes or 
products ?r human activities.' It envisages the prevention of 
pollution by means of a comprehensive policy, appropriate 
legislation, the setting of standards, application of the Beet 
Practicable Environmental Option (BPEO), fostering of positive 
attitudes and participation in the international sphere. 45 It 
also proposes a national strategy for integrated waste 
management which will include the concepts of accountability, 
responsibility, minimising wastes and reuse. Other important 
principles specified in the Policy include 
* no bad legacy principle - the present generation should not
leave future generations with a bad legacy of community
health and contaminated sites,
# ANC Standing Committee Lecture. 
45 Ibid. 
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* polluter pays principle - the polluter should pay for the
negative environmental consequences of its actions and this
should be implemented in practise by recovering from the
polluter the direct costs associated with its pollution, 46 
* self regulation - experience has shown that self regulation
under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) in
the United States has not always worked and at times has
allowed generators to avoid regulation by falsifying their
claims.� Consequently it is submitted that this would not
be the correct route to take in South Africa,
* cradle-to-grave principle - the regulatory system should
provide for a holistic approach to the entire waste cycle,
beginning with where the generation of waste is first
contemplated and ending with its recycling, destruction or
safe disposal, 48
* precautionary principle - hazardous waste of an unknown
composition or hazard should be treated as if it is of the
most hazardous class,
46 One of the problems of being contaminated or poisoned by 
hazardous waste is that such effects are not always immediately 
visible and as such cannot be traced directly back to the 
polluter. On the other hand the question would be where to draw 
the line between what constitutes a direct cost and an indirect 
cost. 
47 See B .Needleman 'Hazardous Waste Recycling Under the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act: Problems and Potential 
Solutions' (1994) 24 Environmental Law 971. 
a This is the approach adopted by Bamako but not by Basel, 
yet South Africa ratified the latter. It does, however, fall 
short of Bamako in that this principle should impose 
responsibility in perpetuity on the generator. It allows for 
ownership and responsibility of the wastes to pass from one 
person to another, which unfortunately, it is submitted, merely 
encourages the trade in waste. 
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* pro-active approach - advocates a management system that
will anticipate adverse impacts on human health, safety and
the environment,
* participation and consultation participation of all
interested and affected parties in the formulation of
government policy, which is essential for Integrated
Environmental Management (IEM),
* remediation and sanction - the State should be empowered to
clean up waste sites and other sources of pollution that
represent a hazard to human health, safety and the
environment. This goes without saying, but it is also
submitted that the State be held accountable for failure to
do so, or even to act timeously in preventing an accident
from occurring. Furthermore, nothing is said of the
strictness of the sanctions to be imposed, be they penal or
pecuniary, and
* pecuniary provisions this requires generators,
transporters, brokers and operators under certain
circumstances (only) to cover the liability associated with
rehabilitation and closure of facilities. As it stands, it
is submitted that this contradicts the polluter pays
principle discussed above and should consequently be
extended to cover all circumstances and not just certain
ones as specified.
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Apart from what has been considered above, the Policy has been 
criticised for numerous reasons. Firstly, there was little or no 
participation by workers, NGOs and CBOs, which flies in the face 
of the principle of participation and consultation embodied in 
the Policy49 , and therefore does not correspond with the 
intention of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) 
to make legislation transparent and accessible. Secondly, the 
Policy makes express provision for the import of hazardous 
waste50 and does so by basing its arguments on two reasons -
* South Africa has the resources and infrastructure to
develop treatment and disposal facilities to a high
standard. Responding to this claim, it seems hard to
believe, considering the catastrophe of Thor which admitted
that for three years it had stockpiled waste and not made
any product from recovered mercury. 51 Furthermore, the
Policy states that its main aim is to protect human health
and safety as well as the environment. How can this even be
considered when, at the same time, it endorses the import
of hazardous waste? The argument further states that
neighbouring countries might not be able to treat and
dispose of hazardous waste to the same standard that South
Africa can, and will therefore resort to practices that
will impact adversely on the regional environment. It then
proposes to make South Africa's facilities available to
these other countries. Firstly, this assumes that South
Africa has higher standard facilities, which from past
experience, it is evident that it may not. Secondly, it
� This is only a draft policy and therefore does allow for 
public participation, but only once the draft has been completed, 
and not before. Whether this is the correct way to go about it 
is debatable. Consequently, it is submitted that comment and 
participation should be encouraged in the drafting of any future 
policy and not afterwards. 
ID Paragraph 4.7. 
51 This so-called state-of-the-art technology claimed the 
lives of two of Thor's workers. 
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encourages the relocation to the sub-continent of dirty 
industries instead of advocating clean production methods, 
and finally, since there is no guarantee that South 
Africa's neighbours will not import hazardous wastes 
themselves, the Policy should have made provision for the 
transfer of expertise in waste management to help them 
manage their own waste rather than practically volunteering 
South Africa to accept it instead.n 
* By-products serving as raw materials for other purposes are
classified as wastes in terms of Basel. A blanket ban would
therefore jeopardise and impact adversely on present 
economic and industrial activities, and would also affect 
prosperity and employment. Furthermore, no environmental 
benefits would accrue by restricting import of' goods 
intended for re-use. The argument ends by stating that a 
ban should only apply to wastes intended for final 
disposal. For a start, this would be in direct 
contravention of Decision II/12.� Secondly, any claim of 
such a ban affecting prosperity and employment can easily 
be countered by arguing that by introducing clean 
production methods one would not only increase the concept 
of prosperity as a whole, but also provide new 
possibilities for employment. By implementing this new 
technology one would not only have to train people to 
operate it, but also train people how to teach those to 
operate it. 
The policy also proposes a sub-region in which there will be no 
ban on the trade in hazardous waste to and from South Africa. It 
is not clear from the Policy who will choose the region, how it 
will be established and what will happen to the people living in 
that region. 54 Furthermore, due to the vagueness of this entire 
il Monitor, October 1995 3. 
53 See Ch 5 n 11-34 and accompanying text supra.
54 ANC Standing Committee Lecture. 
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proposal, would this allow a loophole to develop, through which 
waste could travel, allowing a country outside the sub-region to 
dump their wastes in the sub-region and then arrange for it to 
be imported from there, or will this be prohibited? 
A third criticism of the Policy is that no mention is made of 
worker protection, this is a serious problem given the events 
surrounding the controversy of Thor Chemicals. Any future 
proposal for the management of hazardous wastes, or amendment to 
this Policy should be obligated to take note of the concerns of 
workers given the potential hazards that affect their daily 
lives. Guidance should be taken from the Occupational Health and 
Safety Act55 and the regulations promulgated thereunder. 56
Fourthly, section 29 of the Constitutiod7 guarantees a person 
the right to an environment that is not detrimental to his or 
her health or-well-being. This in itself could justify opposing 
the implementation of- the Policy in that allowing the import of 
hazardous wastes could be detrimental to a person's health or 
well-being, thereby constituting a breach of a fundamental 
55 No. 85 of 1993.
56 See n 33 & 34 and accompanying text. 
57 Act 200 of 1993. section 23 of the Working Draft of the 
Constitution (22 November 1995) provides for the following: 
Everyone has the right: 
(a) to an environment that is not detrimental to their well­
being;
(b) to have their environment protected through reasonable




prevent pollution and environmental degradation; 
promote conservation; and 
secure sustainable development and use of natural 
resources. 
This is a stronger right than the existing one in that through 
subsection (b) it obliges the state to take an active role in 
protecting the environment and not only focuses on the 
environment from a human perspective. It is submitted that if 
this right were in force today it would form a legitimate claim 
against the implementation of the Policy. 
right. 




depending on the application of the 
nevertheless section 7 (4) (a) states the 
'When an infringement of or threat to any right entrenched 
in this Chapter is alleged, any person referred to in 
paragraph (b) shall be entitled to apply to a competent 
court of law for appropriate relief, which may include a 
declaration of rights.,s9
Furthermore, although the Policy genuinely seeks to acknowledge 
the importance of the environment with respect to the 
formulation of the Policy, all of these acknowledgements are 
qualified by economic considerations. This qualification is 
carried throughout the document, and it would appear that it is 
given preference in light of the fact that South Africa is a 
developing country. This is understandable, given the country's 
economic status, as long as these concerns are not detrimental 
to the environment. Short-term economic gains should never be 
considered ahead of long-term prosperity and well-being. 
The Policy does not deal with all the facets of waste including 
collection and disposal and lacks any real focus on avoidance, 
reuse and recycling of waste. 60 Finally, an important 
observation to make about the implementation of the Policy is 
that day-to-day management of waste appears to be handled by 
local authorities. This could be cause for concern considering 
that many of the local authorities may not have the necessary 
58 Section 33 Act 200/l993. 
59 The liberalisation of the locus standi requirement was 
recently upheld in the Constitutional Court decision of Van 
Huyssteen NO and Others v Minister of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism and Others 1995 (9) BCLR 1191 (c) 
� ANC Standing Committee Lecture. 
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expertise to implement these policies effectively. 61
This Draft Policy has not been made final. However, the Deputy 
Minister of the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, 
Bantu Holomisa, convened the Consultative Conference on National 
Environmental Policy {CONNEP) on 17 & 18 August, 1995 with the 
aim of drafting a national environmental policy that will have 
the support of NGO's, CBO's, labour, industry and the South 
African public in general. 62 An important statement came out of 
CONNEP when Minister de Villiers said that there would be a 
complete ban on hazardous waste.fil If this is the case then the 
possibility of the Draft Policy ever being implemented is 
somewhat slim. According to the timetable agreed upon at CONNEP, 
a White Paper should be produced by mid-1996.� Included in the 
White Paper, no doubt, will be a definition of hazardous waste, 
to which the attention of this chapter will know turn. 
Trying to Define Hazardous Waste 
Trying to define hazardous waste has been the source of many a 
controversy throughout the world. What is of serious concern, is 
that until very recently South Africa had no formal definition 
on the subject at all. This is coupled with the fact that there 
is no comprehensive piece of legislation governing the topic at 
present either, and, although the ECA defines waste, it does not 
define hazardous waste. 6.5 Its definition is contained in a 
number of documents including the Policy on Hazardous Waste 
61 Ibid. 





Management, and Document Two of the Waste Management Series� 
published by the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry. 
However, it has its origins in a 1992 CSIR report entitled 
'Hazardous Waste in South Africa' 67 and is defined as 
'any waste that directly or indirectly represents a threat 
to human health or the environment by introducing one or 
more of the following risks: 
* explosion or fire,
* infections, pathogens, parasites or their vectors,
* chemical instability, reaction or corrosion,
* acute or chronic toxicity,
* cancer, mutations or birth defects
* toxicity, or damage to the ecosystems or natural
resources,
* accumulation in biological foodchains, persistence in
the environment, or multiple effects;
so that it requires special attention and cannot be 
released into the environment or be added to sewage or be 
stored in a situation which is either open to air or from 
which aqueous leachate could emanate. ' 68 
� Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, 1994. Waste 
Management Series. Minimum Requirements for the Handling and 
Disposal of Hazardous Waste. 
67 Department of Environment Affairs, 1992. Hazardous Waste 
in South Africa. R.G. Noble (Ed). 
� Once a waste has been classified as hazardous it will be 
necessary to differentiate it from other waste, and, for the time 
being, classified according to the classes in SABS Code 0228, 
which corresponds directly with Annex III of the Basel 
Convention. 
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An important qualification of this definition is that it not 
only depends on the effects of the waste on humans but also 
recognises, as equally important, its effects on the 
environment. This latter point is important since a definition 
which does not take into account the relationship between the 
material and the environment into which it will enter will be 
too broad. It will capture things that are not hazardous and 
will direct scarce resources towards making safe things that 
were not dangerous to start with. 69 Consequently whether a waste 
is hazardous will depend on its physical, chemical and 
infectious characteristics, and 
concentration70 in the environment. 
on its quantity and 
This is an extremely comprehensive but broad definition and as 
a result some more specific terms need to be introduced to make 
it practically meaningful to officials, waste generators and 
operators. 71 Furthermore, and of particular concern, is the fact 
that there is no control of medical wasten in South Africa. To 
69 H.Bradby (Ed) 'Dirty Words: Writings on the History and




Medical Association 'Hazardous Waste & Human 
IX (hereafter referred to as British Medical 
71 Peckham 99. 
n There are two ways in which medical wastes may present a 
hazard, infectivity and toxicity. Infectious wastes include human 
tissue, body fluids, swabs, dressings and needles. Toxic wastes 
include drugs and chemicals used in clinical practice. Waste 
drugs are those that have been returned by hospital wards, 
spilled, outdated, contaminated, or no longer required. 
Disposal of medical wastes was given widespread publicity in the 
U.K. when hospital wastes destined for incineration were found 
on landfill sites, and it is becoming more of an issue with the 
increase in single-use medical products. This has resulted in an 
increase in the volume of (plastic) wastes to be incinerated and 
has both a positive and negative result. One the positive side 
one perceived hazard is eliminated - possible infection from the 
reuse of instruments - but replaced by another - a possible 
increase in air pollution as a result of the greater volume of 
waste to be incinerated. British Medical Association 32-33. 
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counter this, medical waste should be recognised as a form of 
hazardous waste as it is in Both Basel and Bamako, and 
throughout the world. This would ensure that hospitals, clinics, 
dental practises, veterinary clinics and the like become 
registered as generators of hazardous wastes, thereby falling 
under the jurisdiction of the applicable legislation along with 
other waste generators. 
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VII: CONCLUSION. 
Hazardous waste means different things to different people at 
different times and this is one of the main problems that have 
undermined attempts to regulate its generation, movement and 
disposal, not only locally but also internationally. In the past 
hazardous waste remained under lock and key until the horrifying 
revelations in the 1980s. It was only then that people realised 
that something had to be done about the outright and callous 
exploitation of the developing nations by their developed 
counterparts. South Africa was one of these, and, as result of 
numerous embarrassing situations it finally realised the dangers 
inherent in the hazardous waste trade. 
The whole problem of hazardous waste, it is submitted, is not so 
much the definition itself, but rather, where one draws the line 
between what constitutes hazardous waste and what does not, 
having special regard for so-called secondary raw materials and 
waste intended for recycling. These controversies will hopefully 
be resolved by the amendment of Basel to include Decision II/12 
which bans the export of all hazardous wastes to non-OECD 
countries, whether intended for final disposal or recycling, 
reuse and recovery. 
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Locally, South Africa can do its part by ratifying Bamako1 and 
by promulgating a specific waste Act to incorporate all previous 
legislation into a single comprehensive Act (eg: Waste Act) when 
contemplating the future regulation of hazardous waste. The 
following, it is submitted, could also be considered -
* a complete definition of waste, and more importantly
hazardous waste, must be included in the Act,
* include medical waste in the definition of hazardous waste,
* prohibit the import and export of all hazardous wastes
regardless of purpose, and prevent the generation of such
wastes by encouraging the adoption of clean production
methods, and where possible, recycling, without derogating
from the provisions set out in the Act,
* contain a specific chapter on hazardous waste, governing
all aspects, including its generation, 
transport, treatment and disposal,
collection,
* prohibit the disposal of hazardous waste in South Africa,
not only on land, but also in the sea within the coastal
jurisdiction, as well as on the high seas,
* acknowledge the ratification of Basel (and Bamako) by
formally including the ratification(s) into the Act,
1 Ratifying Bamako should not pose a problem with respect to 
South Africa's involvement in Basel since article 11 of the 
latter Convention specifically allows for such a scenario. And, 
as already mentioned, the consequences of such a ratification 
would be endless, given South Africa's new-found status on the 
African continent, and the fact that Bamako only needs one more 
ratification for it to enter into force as a legally binding 
international document. 
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* transfer the control of waste from the Department of Water
Affairs and Forestry to the Department of Environmental
Affairs and Tourism. This is necessary, it is submitted, in
order to streamline the involvement of government 
departments, and is in keeping with the spirit of 
formulating a single comprehensive waste Act, as well as 
adopting the cradle-to-grave approach of monitoring its 
entire lifecycle, 
* recognition of employees working with hazardous substances
or wastes, with specific 
Heal th and Safety Act 
promulgated thereunder,
reference to the Occupational
and applicable regulations
* stringent penal and criminal sanctions for any offence
committed under the Act, and
* the State must by bound by the provisions contained
therein.
One of the most important lessons learnt is that there has to be 
a public right to know in that people should have a right to 
know about activities and situations that may detrimentally 
affect their well-being. 
for a right of access 
South Africa's Constitution provides 
to inf ormation2 but only where this 
information is held by government bodies. This does not extend 
to information held by private persons. 3 However, The Working 
Draft of the new Constitution4 at section 3l(l) (b) states that 
a person has the right to 'any information that is held by 
2 s 23 Act 200 of 1993. See Van Huyssteen v Minister 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism 1995 (9) BCLR 1191 (c) which 
dealt with access to information of all information relevant to 
the construction of a proposed steel mill near the West Coast 
National Park and Langebaan Lagoon. 
3 Peckham 104 fn 72. 
4 22 November, 1995. 
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another natural or juristic person and that is required for the 
exercise or protection of any rights.' This, it is submitted, 
will greatly assist individuals in seeking to enforce their 
Constitutionally protected rights, even though it is 
acknowledged that there may have to be some restriction on this 
right when there is a risk of exposing another's trade secrets, 
provided that these themselves do not infringe the affected 
person's rights. The United States has the Emergency Planning 
and Community Right-to-Know Act5 which is intended to enable 
communities to acquire sufficient information regarding 
activities involving chemicals, and enable them to prepare 
adequately for emergencies involving them, 6 and it is along 
these lines that similar legislation could be promulgated in 
South Africa. 
No matter what the outcome, people need to be kept informed 
about the possible risks associated with hazardous wastes and 
their management. Accordingly, in order to achieve greater 
public access, there has to be willingness on the part of both 
industry and the government to make all the necessary and 
relevant information available so that an educated and informed 
conclusion can be successfully reached. It is clear, therefore, 
that an uneducated or misinformed public has the right to issues 
affecting public and environmental health. However, it is also 
clear that such information must be given in an impartial and 
unbiased manner to enable all those influenced by the hazardous 
waste to reach a proper and informed decision. 
5 1986 42 use section 1011 ff. 
6 Peckham 104. 
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The recognition of a right to know should not be seen as an 
alternative to proper regulation of hazardous waste7 but rather 
as a means to an end, by convincing industry to make public its 
intent with respect to the topic of hazardous waste as a whole. 
This could place it under some degree of moral pressure to 
comply with the accepted norms8 of the times. 
Things are finally moving forward in the field of hazardous 
waste management and although the Department of Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism's Policy on Hazardous Waste has been heavily 
criticised, invaluable lessons were learnt, and, it is hoped 
that these lessons will be carried through CONNEP and culminate 
in a final comprehensive policy for hazardous waste management 
in South Africa in the near future. 
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